The latest:

Dozens of Israeli Air Force fighter jets and refueling aircraft flew more than 800 miles to the edge of Iranian airspace on Monday, according to Israeli and U.S. officials cited by Axios. The aircraft tracked a flight path consistent with a potential strike on Iran before turning around short of the border. The operation came a week before Israel’s election.

Details:

• The route: The formation passed through Syrian and Iraqi airspace on a corridor consistent with an actual strike package against Iran, according to the sources cited by Axios. As the jets neared the Iranian border they reversed course and returned to Israel. No Israeli figure has publicly detailed how long the aircraft remained airborne.
• The framing: Israel notified Washington in advance and described the mission as a training exercise for “power projection,” the sources said, aimed at deterring Iran from attacking before the vote. Some Israeli and U.S. officials said the sortie was not unusual.
• The U.S. read: U.S. officials said the Israelis knew Iranian air defenses would detect the aircraft. Some U.S. sources told Axios they came away with the impression Israel hoped Iran would open fire on the jets, which would supply a justification for launching strikes against Iranian targets.
• The risk: Officials cited by Axios said the operation could have produced a miscalculation, drawing an Iranian response and reigniting the war between the two countries. That assessment was attributed to Israeli and American officials rather than to any formal military evaluation.
• The timing: The sortie fell on the same day Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Israel’s Ovda Air Base, though officials said the flight was not connected to the visit. Israel votes on Oct. 27.
• The earlier debate: Axios reported last week that Netanyahu and President Trump discussed in early October a major new operation against Iran before the Israeli and U.S. elections. Netanyahu cited Israeli intelligence indicating Iran was taking steps to reconstitute its nuclear program. Trump ultimately rejected the proposal.
• The military objection: IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir told Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine that restarting the war in that window could force a postponement of the Israeli elections, since Iran would probably retaliate, the sources said. An Israeli official added that Zamir will not permit unjustified military activity capable of undermining the Oct. 27 vote.
• Netanyahu’s words: At a military graduation ceremony Wednesday, Netanyahu said Iran’s supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei had decided to follow his father’s path and allowed Iranian scientists to advance toward a weapon. He said the only way to remove the threat was to overthrow the Iranian regime, calling it the directive he gave the IDF, Mossad and security agencies.
• Other coverage: Fox News reported on Tuesday that the Israeli Air Force conducted a drill toward Iran, without describing the route or the number of aircraft involved.

Background:

Israel and Iran fought a direct war whose resumption both the sortie and the October talks could have triggered, according to the officials cited by Axios. Netanyahu has since told Trump that Iranian steps to rebuild the nuclear program concern him.

Between the lines:

Three facts sit uncomfortably together: a strike-shaped flight path, Israeli awareness that Iranian radars would see it, and an election eight days away. Zamir’s reported warning that war would delay the vote, and his stated refusal to allow unjustified operations, point to a gap between the political and military leaderships over how far deterrence messaging should go before Oct. 27.

What’s next

Watch for any Iranian military or diplomatic response to the sortie, further Israeli air activity before the Oct. 27 vote, and whether Trump revisits the operation Netanyahu proposed in October.

The post Axios: Israeli jets crossed Iraqi airspace to Iran’s border, officials say appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Iraq’s request for an International Monetary Fund loan programme has opened a credibility argument at home, with economist Ziyad al-Hashimi saying the move contradicts the government’s own case for devaluing the dinar. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva confirmed on October 17 that Baghdad had asked for a programme and said the Fund intended to provide strong financial and policy support.

Details:

• The IMF confirmation: Georgieva’s October 17 remarks establish only that a request was made. They do not establish that a programme received final approval or that any funds have been disbursed, and the size, financing terms and policy commitments were not set out in her announcement.
• Al-Hashimi’s core charge: According to the remarks supplied for this report, al-Hashimi says the prime minister had defended cutting the dinar’s value as a way to avoid more painful measures, external borrowing among them. Going to the IMF, he contends, undermines that justification and raises questions about public finance management.
• The household cost: Al-Hashimi warns an IMF-supported programme could carry commitments to restrain spending, raise revenue and reform subsidies, with fuel and electricity potentially affected. These are outcomes he anticipates rather than confirmed conditions attached to the requested programme.
• His demand: He calls on the government to explain publicly why external financing is needed, how the money would be used, and what obligations Iraq would assume in return.
• The precedent: Iraq is not the first country in the Middle East and North Africa to seek IMF lending. The Fund approved a $5.34 billion Stand-By Arrangement for Iraq in 2016, following emergency financing in 2015, according to the IMF.
• Salem’s target: Imad Abdul Latif Salem criticises the proposed Ministry of Digital Economy, arguing Iraq’s priority should instead be a Ministry of Economy with a substantive mandate to develop production, strengthen private enterprise and coordinate policy across government.
• The sweeping claim: Salem contends Iraq lacks an economy or a private sector in the institutional sense, a deliberately broad critique. His underlying argument is that the country lacks the productive structures and effective institutions needed to turn economic activity into sustained development.
• The merger plan: Salem proposes consolidating ministries rather than multiplying them: abolishing the Ministry of Trade and merging Planning and Finance into a single ministry preparing both the investment and operating components of the budget.
• The coordination argument: That merged institution would work alongside a Ministry of Economy and the central bank to improve coordination between fiscal, monetary and trade policies. Modernisation, in Salem’s view, requires more than attaching contemporary labels to ministries.

Background:

Iraq’s exchange-rate adjustment was presented by the government as the alternative to harsher options, including external borrowing. That framing is what al-Hashimi now measures the IMF request against.

Between the lines:

The two critiques run on separate tracks but meet at the same point. Al-Hashimi asks what Iraq may have to accept to obtain financing; Salem asks whether its institutions could use the resources effectively if it got them. Read together, borrowing terms and ministerial restructuring are both judged against productive capacity rather than against each other.

What’s next

Watch for IMF board action on the requested programme, any published terms on spending, revenue or subsidy reform, and whether Baghdad advances the Ministry of Digital Economy proposal Salem opposes.

The post Two Economists Challenge Iraq’s IMF Turn and Ministry Plans appeared first on Ontime+.

Summary:

The latest:

Iraq’s new fiscal terms are drawing the world’s largest oil companies back to a country they largely abandoned a decade ago, with Chevron, BP, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil in talks or already committed, Chevron chief executive Mike Wirth said returns follow risk and that the economics now look better in Iraq.

Details:

• The terms: Baghdad is offering contracts with more in common with production-sharing agreements than the old service contracts, according to the column. The earlier model paid a small flat rate per barrel and barred companies from booking reserves on their ledgers; the new one gives exposure to rising prices and allows reserve booking.
• The capacity target: With contracts signed and those under negotiation, Iraq could raise capacity to 5.5 million barrels a day by 2030,  Before the war Iraq pumped roughly 4.5 million a day, and Baghdad has long aimed for 6 million, which would rank it second in the Middle East behind Saudi Arabia.
• The bigger ambition: Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has spoken in recent months of lifting capacity to 8 million and even 10 million barrels a day beyond 2035. The column judged those targets unrealistic, arguing a 20%-30% increase would itself be an enormous achievement under current conditions.
• TotalEnergies first: France’s TotalEnergies broke the pattern three years ago as the first major to enter Iraq under improved terms, with a $27 billion multi-year investment across oil and gas fields. Chief executive Patrick Pouyanné said he had no regrets despite the war, calling Middle East oil the cheapest available.
• The Chevron deal: Chevron has signed a preliminary agreement with Baghdad covering assets once held by Russia’s Lukoil, with a final contract expected in 2027, the column said. BP signed its own contract last year and brought ConocoPhillips into the project a few months ago.
• The export problem: Iraq could face difficulty if the Strait of Hormuz remains a war zone. Baghdad already ships limited crude volumes through a bypass pipeline running north via Turkey to the Mediterranean, where tankers can load. The end of Syria’s civil war opens the possibility of a shorter westward route.
• The OPEC question: How the cartel would accommodate much higher Iraqi pumping remains unresolved. The author saw two likely outcomes: OPEC turning a blind eye to overproduction as it did with Algeria and the United Arab Emirates, or Iraq ignoring the cartel and eventually leaving it.
• Current output: Iraq is pumping well below its maximum capacity because of the US-Iran war, which nonetheless expects more crude from Baghdad in the near future.
• The history: The first opening came in 2003, after the US invasion removed Saddam Hussein, who had kept Iraq’s geological endowment largely closed to foreign firms after taking power in 1979. Majors signed deals then but left within years, concluding returns did not compensate for the risk.

Background:

Wirth spoke at the Energy Intelligence Forum in London last week, the same gathering where Pouyanné appeared. What the majors sought after 2003, and what George W. Bush and Dick Cheney had signaled, was production-sharing agreements they never received.

Between the lines:

 Baghdad is positioned to emerge as a winner of the regional crisis, attracting billions precisely while the fighting continues. The reasoning rests on facts stated above: terms that now carry price upside and reserve booking, a 2003-era grievance finally addressed, and export routes north through Turkey that reduce dependence on Hormuz. The unresolved OPEC question is the main constraint.

What’s next

Chevron’s final contract for the former Lukoil assets is expected in 2027. Watch whether Hormuz stays contested, whether a shorter westward pipeline through Syria advances, and how OPEC responds to Iraqi volumes above quota.

The post Chevron, BP and Exxon court Baghdad as Iraq sweetens oil terms appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

The departure of US-led coalition forces on September 30 has stripped Iraq’s armed factions of a central argument for keeping their weapons, and Moqtada Al Sadr is moving into that gap. Experts and officials told The National the Shiite cleric is reinforcing a nationalist platform built on keeping Baghdad out of regional conflicts, limiting Iranian influence and restoring the state’s monopoly on force.

Details:

• The deadline: Armed groups were expected to disarm by the September 30 withdrawal date, according to The National, but that deadline has since been pushed to June next year. No mechanism for enforcing the new date has been announced, and the question of why factions still operate outside state control remains open.
• The rebranding: Al Sadr fought American troops during the occupation and commanded a militia with millions of followers. Over the past decade he has recast himself as a nationalist and anti-corruption campaigner, emerging as a political kingmaker while his movement, the Sadrists, stepped back from mainstream politics.
• The loyalty problem: Renad Mansour, director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, told The National that Al Sadr has long advocated dissolving factions operating outside state control. But absorbing fighters into government institutions does not settle where their loyalties sit, Mansour said, or whether an informal chain of command survives.
• The clerical angle: Mansour said Al Sadr’s vision merges religious and political authority, holding that clerics should be active in politics rather than confined to religious affairs. He assessed that the cleric is charting a role bridging both branches of Iraqi public life.
• The regional read: Bente Scheller of the Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung in Berlin told The National that proxies are the method of choice in the region, and that Tehran deploys them in its own interest, often colliding with the national interests of host countries. A statesmanlike posture, she assessed, could take Iraq out of the line of fire.
• The aide’s framing: Dhia Al Assadi, a former Iraqi minister and adviser to Al Sadr, said the cleric has consistently urged others to sacrifice political or material gains to stabilise Iraq. His outlook abroad, Al Assadi said, rests on mutual respect, co-operation and shared interests.
• On Washington: Al Assadi said the region could benefit if American policymakers adopted a new approach and learnt from past mistakes, pointing to Al Sadr’s call for a new chapter in US-Iraqi ties. Optimism would be limited, he added, if Washington kept pursuing narrow interests at the expense of regional stability.
• The long game: Marsin Al Shammary, assistant professor of political science at Boston College, told The National that Al Sadr foresees a political future for himself and does not want to undermine it by appearing anti-state. She cited his “remarkable ability to mobilise and demobilise his followers”.
• The Najaf track: Al Shammary said Al Sadr has been making overtures towards Najaf, home to Iraq’s senior Shiite clerics, and may seek closeness with the eventual successor to Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani. Both sides, she said, agree on limiting Iranian influence over that succession.

Background:

Najaf was the site of a 2004 rebellion against US forces by militias loyal to Al Sadr. Members of his Saraya Al Salam attended a ceremony in Samarra in June marking their integration into Iraqi security forces. Sadrist posters urged a boycott of the November 2025 parliamentary elections.

Between the lines:

The withdrawal removed the justification factions used for their arsenals, handing Al Sadr an opening his rivals did not choose. The Samarra integration shows the model he is backing, and Mansour’s caution applies directly: fighters inside state institutions may still answer to an informal chain. How his own forces disarm will test whether the statesman framing holds.

What’s next

The June disarmament deadline is the next hard marker, along with any move by Washington on a new framework for US-Iraqi ties and signals from Najaf over the Sistani succession.

The post Al Sadr pushes state monopoly on arms after US withdrawal appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Iraqi crude is set to move overland to a Mediterranean port by lorry starting in mid-October, under a route Syria has agreed to provide, Bloomberg reported Friday. Yousef Qiblawy, chief executive of state-owned Syrian Petroleum, said the agreement between Baghdad and Damascus is almost complete and that exports should begin as soon as possible.

Details:

• The arrangement: Iraq requested assistance from Syrian authorities to move crude products by lorry to a Mediterranean port, Bloomberg reported, citing Qiblawy, who said the first chain of trucks is expected to arrive by mid-October. He gave no final signing date, no export volumes, no pricing terms and did not name the receiving port.
• The quote: Qiblawy told Bloomberg that Iraqi oil exports are expected to “start as soon as possible”, describing the deal between the two governments as almost done.
• What came before: The plan follows energy coordination in late September, when Iraq began importing petrol through Syria. An Iraqi Oil Ministry official told The National a first cargo of 32,000 tonnes of petrol was being unloaded at the Baniyas refinery for onward transport to Iraq by lorry.
• The fuel oil precedent: Syria became the main route for Iraqi fuel oil exports in April, partially offsetting shipment disruption caused by the war in Iran. At least 2.1 million tonnes of Iraqi fuel oil have moved by lorry to Baniyas since then, according to the report.
• Why it matters to Baghdad: Iraq, Opec’s second-largest producer, draws at least 90 per cent of its revenue from oil. Roughly 3.3 million barrels a day crossed the Strait of Hormuz from its southern Basra terminals before the war, leaving the bulk of state income exposed to a single waterway.
• The chokepoint: About a fifth of the world’s energy exports passed through the Strait of Hormuz before the war, and it remains a flashpoint in the eight-month conflict. Iraq has faced one of its most serious economic and security situations since fighting broke out in February.
• The flow data: The seven-day moving average for Gulf crude exports stood at 18.3 million barrels per day on September 30, against an average 18 million bpd in the 12 months before the war, according to ship-tracking firm Kpler. The figures cover Hormuz, the Red Sea and other methods.
• The shipping shift: Last Sunday, the state-owned Iraqi Oil Tankers Company moved two million barrels of its own crude beyond the Strait of Hormuz for the first time in decades. Director general Ali Qais said the aim is to shift part of exports away from the free-on-board Basra model toward better pricing.
• The refining gap: Despite its scale as a crude producer, Iraq faces petrol shortages tied to refinery problems and the management of its energy infrastructure. Qais said the tanker company is also in talks to buy specialised crude tankers and compete with regional peers.
• The Washington angle: The agreements mark a deepening of Baghdad-Damascus ties as the United States pushes for closer relations between the two countries, according to the report. Neither government has detailed the commercial terms or the duration of the transit arrangements.

Between the lines:

Trucking crude is slower and costlier than tanker shipping, so the mid-October convoys read less as a commercial upgrade than as insurance: Iraq is building a second outlet for a revenue stream that is 90 per cent of the budget and almost entirely routed through one strait. The Baniyas fuel oil and petrol flows show the corridor already works in both directions.

What’s next

Watch whether the first truck convoys reach Syria by mid-October and whether Baghdad and Damascus formally sign the agreement. Also watch Kpler’s Gulf export averages and any move by the Iraqi Oil Tankers Company to purchase its own tankers.

Sources:

The post Iraq to truck crude to Syria’s Mediterranean coast from mid-October appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Iraq’s central bank devalued the dinar by about 15%, setting the rate for sales to the public at 1,520 per dollar against 1,320 previously, the Iraqi News Agency reported. The decision landed after months of fiscal strain tied to the Iran war and interrupted oil exports. Baghdad had publicly ruled out any exchange-rate adjustment as recently as June.

Details:

• The new rate: The central bank set the rate for currency sold to the public at 1,520 dinars per dollar on Wednesday, up from 1,320, according to the Iraqi News Agency. The adjustment amounts to a devaluation of roughly 15% to 16% depending on the reference point used.
• The parallel market: Before the decision, the dollar traded between 1,420 and 1,490 dinars on Iraq’s unofficial market, above the official rate. It is now changing hands between 1,610 and 1,690 dinars, leaving a gap that persists even after the official realignment.
• The reversal: The cut came less than four months after the government and the central bank insisted there was no intention to change the exchange rate. In June, officials also denied plans to print currency or devalue the dinar to offset a liquidity shortage.
• The forged document: That denial followed a forged document circulating at the time which suggested the dollar could be raised to 1,600 dinars. The central bank did not subsequently signal a timetable for the move it has now made.
• The war effect: Pressure on public finances built after the Iran war began and the Strait of Hormuz was closed. Baghdad relies heavily on oil revenue to fund government spending, and the disruption of part of its exports cut dollar inflows into the country.
• The monthly bill: The government needs at least 10 trillion dinars a month to cover salaries and public expenditure, according to previous government statements, while oil accounts for about 90% of budget resources — leaving little cushion when crude shipments are interrupted.
• New governor: The decision came roughly three and a half months after Nizar Nasser Hussein took over as central bank governor on June 21, succeeding Ali Mohsen al-Allaq, as Iraq faced tightened international scrutiny on anti-money-laundering and terrorism-financing files.
• The IMF track: Mazhar Mohammed Saleh, financial adviser to the Council of Ministers, told Asharq Bloomberg in June that Iraq was consulting the International Monetary Fund on the type of assistance it might need if the war’s consequences lasted longer.
• The reserve math: Bloomberg Economics estimated earlier that Iraq needed around $75 billion to maintain the dinar’s fixed peg to the dollar, drawn from foreign reserves of roughly $100 billion on the eve of the war.
• Budget overhaul: Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi formed a committee tasked with cutting the budget’s dependence on oil to 45% within ten years from about 90% now, by raising non-oil revenue including border crossings, customs and collection.

Background:

The dinar had been held at 1,320 per dollar, a peg defended with foreign reserves. Successive governments treated the fixed rate as a political commitment, which is why June’s denials were framed as policy rather than forecast.

Between the lines:

The gap between the new official rate of 1,520 and a parallel market trading as high as 1,690 suggests the devaluation has not closed the spread it was meant to address. With oil supplying 90% of budget resources and 10 trillion dinars needed monthly for salaries, the reserve drawdown estimated by Bloomberg Economics points to a peg that had become expensive to defend.

What’s next

Watch whether the parallel market narrows toward 1,520 in coming weeks, any formal Iraqi request to the IMF, the resumption of disrupted oil exports, and the first milestones from the committee on non-oil revenue.

The post Iraq devalues dinar to 1,520 per dollar after oil revenue squeeze appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Buying supertankers while freight markets are distorted by war could lock Iraq into assets bought at the top of the cycle, economist and international transport consultant Ziyad al-Hashemi said. He argued that exceptional shipping demand has lifted vessel prices to abnormal levels likely to retreat once the crisis ends, and urged the oil ministry to test the market through chartering before committing capital.

Details:

• The timing argument: Al-Hashemi said the current surge in demand for oil transport should not be read as a permanent condition on which a long-term investment decision can be built. His case is that today’s pricing reflects a wartime disruption rather than a structural shift in the tanker market.
• Vessel prices: Demand for ships has reached historic levels, he said, with prices at record highs and delivery waiting periods stretching into years. A purchase agreed now would therefore be priced at a peak and delivered into a market that may already have normalized.
• Market study first: He called on the ministry to review freight rates from before the crisis, contact customers to learn what shipping arrangements they already have in place, and assess whether Iraq can build a competitive and profitable operating model rather than simply owning hulls.
• Staffing question: Al-Hashemi urged an assessment of Iraqi commercial and managerial expertise in business development, marketing, negotiation and client access before any large fleet is established, treating human capability as a precondition rather than something acquired after the ships arrive.
• Seafarer certificates: He asked the ministry to verify the International Maritime Organization’s position on certificates issued to graduates of Iraq’s maritime academy, saying recent updates point to restrictions on them — a constraint that would bear directly on crewing a national fleet.
• Contracting risk: In his own assessment, al-Hashemi flagged the possibility of commissions, manipulation and price inflation in contracting with shipbuilding yards, singling out Chinese yards. He presented this as a procurement exposure to be managed, not as an allegation against any named party.
• The interim option: Rather than moving straight to purchase, he proposed starting — after a full study — with limited time charters or contracts of affreightment covering agreed volumes, an approach that commits far less capital while the market is still unsettled.

Background:

Al-Hashemi argues chartering would let Iraq test its own fleet-management capacity, measure real demand and competition, and train staff before deciding whether to expand leasing or buy new tankers outright.

Between the lines:

His framing puts commercial viability ahead of owning a national fleet as a goal in itself. Having raised delivery waits of several years, record purchase prices, unresolved seafarer certification and contracting exposure, he treats sustainable profit and added value within the global energy chain as the test any purchase must pass — not national ownership.

What’s next

Al-Hashemi asked the government and oil ministry to complete a study of the market, commercial capacity, staffing and leasing options before allocating funds, then decide whether purchase is the most viable route.

The post Iraqi economist warns oil ministry against buying tankers at record prices appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Two million barrels of Iraqi crude crossed the Strait of Hormuz aboard a very large crude carrier operated by Iraq’s state-owned Oil Tanker Company, the company announced. Its director general, Ali Qais Abdul Jabbar, described the voyage as the first operation of its kind by the company in decades, and said it opens better sales and pricing options for the state oil marketer.

Details:

• The cargo: The Oil Tanker Company, owned by the Iraqi state, said it carried 2 million barrels of Iraqi crude on a very large crude carrier, the class of vessel that dominates long-haul Gulf exports. The company did not name the vessel or the destination of the cargo.
• What changed: Rather than handing the crude over to buyers at the port of Basra, the company is now moving it through the strait itself. That shift transfers the shipping leg to the Iraqi side and, according to the announcement, widens the range of markets the cargo can reach.
• The commercial logic: Abdul Jabbar said in a statement that the operation could let state oil marketer SOMO capture better sales and pricing opportunities. Controlling the vessel allows a seller to redirect a cargo while it is at sea rather than fixing the buyer at the loading port.
• The fleet plan: The director general added that the company is working to buy and own specialized crude oil tankers to expand its fleet. The stated aim is to strengthen its ability to compete with regional shipping companies, which currently handle much of the Gulf’s crude haulage.
• The Iranian factor: Iraq has previously secured Iranian permission for its oil tankers to transit the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively closed during its conflict with the United States. No details were given on the terms or duration of that permission.
• The chokepoint: The Strait of Hormuz is the only sea route out of the Gulf, and every barrel loaded at Basra for a buyer beyond the region must pass through it. Access to the waterway therefore determines whether Iraqi-flagged shipping can serve customers outside the Gulf at all.
• The milestone claim: The description of the voyage as a decades-first rests on the company’s own account. Iraqi state shipping has for years played a limited role in moving the country’s own exports, with foreign and regional operators lifting most cargoes from Basra.
• What was not said: The announcement set no timetable for the tanker purchases, did not say how many vessels the company intends to acquire, and gave no indication of whether further transits through the strait are already scheduled.

Background:

Iraq is OPEC’s second-largest producer and ships the bulk of its crude from southern terminals near Basra. Cargoes have traditionally been sold on terms that leave shipping to the buyer, limiting the state tanker company’s role in its own export chain.

Between the lines:

Owning the voyage rather than selling at the loading port is what gives SOMO the flexibility the company is advertising: a cargo under Iraqi control can be re-sold or re-routed at sea. But the same shift ties Iraqi exports to continued Iranian clearance for transit through a waterway Tehran has effectively closed, converting a commercial gain into a political dependency.

What’s next

Whether further Iraqi-operated transits follow this one, and whether the tanker company announces actual vessel purchases or a fleet target, will show if this was a single operation or a change in how Iraq sells its crude.

The post Iraq ships 2 million barrels through Hormuz in decades-first run appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest

The United States is moving roughly 9,000 additional troops toward the Middle East aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group and USS Makin Island amphibious ready group, reinforcing its forces as President Donald Trump considers renewed strikes on Iran. The deployment, comprising more than 7,000 sailors and 2,000 Marines, could put three American aircraft carriers in the region by late October while diplomacy over the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains unresolved.

Details

• Carrier overlap: The Theodore Roosevelt is joining the USS George H.W. Bush and USS George Washington in the broader Middle East. If all three groups overlap, the regional deployment would exceed 20,000 sailors and Marines and include hundreds of aircraft. The Navy previously operated three carrier groups there in April, its first such concentration since 2003.
• Deployment schedule: The Roosevelt left San Diego on September 27 for an expected extended deployment under US Central Command. It is ultimately expected to relieve the Japan-based George Washington, allowing Washington to sustain operations while rotating crews and ships.
• Operational scope: The added forces give Washington greater flexibility for air strikes, maritime protection, missile defense and possible operations around Hormuz. The buildup follows an unusually large naval presence maintained during operations against Iran.
• Flight investigation: Investigators are examining an incident aboard a FlyDubai flight from the UAE to Israel carrying 182 people. The aircraft made an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia after the Omani co-pilot allegedly stabbed the Indian captain, with passengers and crew helping regain control during a rapid descent. Trump said an Iranian connection was possible, offered no evidence and said Tehran would be hit “very hard” if responsible. The investigation has not established an Iranian role; Saudi, Emirati, Israeli, Omani and US officials are examining terrorism and other possible motives.
• Hormuz pressure: Trump said Iran offered to reopen Hormuz in its latest proposal, but he rejected the broader terms as insufficient. Brent crude rose more than 4% on Thursday to settle above $102 a barrel as markets weighed renewed action and supply disruption.
• Regional exposure: For Gulf states, US forces strengthen deterrence around infrastructure and shipping. Renewed escalation could also increase threats to airspace, ports, energy facilities and commercial routes, while exposing Israel and the Gulf to attacks and disruption across aviation and shipping.

Background

Seven months into the war, the deployment underscores the shift from Trump’s initial expectation of a relatively short campaign. Iranian officials have confirmed receiving a US response to their latest proposal, while Washington maintains military operations and diplomatic channels.

What’s next

Late October will show whether the Theodore Roosevelt overlaps with the two carriers already operating in the region. Further decisions are expected after the November 3 midterm elections, alongside the multinational FlyDubai investigation and negotiations over Iran’s proposal to reopen Hormuz.

The post US Sends 9,000 More Troops as Iran Options Widen appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

The last major American military base in Iraq closed Wednesday, ending a presence that spanned more than 23 years and $1.7 trillion, according to The Wall Street Journal. The same date was Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s deadline for Iran-backed militias to surrender their weapons. Zaidi and his deputies are now discussing pushing that deadline into next year.

Details:

• The drawdown: A US defense official said equipment and personnel were airlifted out of Erbil, the last American base, in time for Wednesday’s deadline. Current and former US officials said a Patriot battery stationed around Erbil has already been removed, and remaining air defenses will likely concentrate on the Baghdad embassy and Erbil consulate.
• What stays behind: Some US Marines will remain to protect diplomatic missions, alongside contractors maintaining Iraq’s F-16 fleet and American-made tanks, current and former US officials said. A Pentagon official said Washington is ending its official military operation but retains intelligence, surveillance and other regional capabilities that could be used in Iraq.
• The attack tempo: Militants and Iranian forces launched more than 600 attacks on US diplomatic and military facilities in Iraq during the war’s first two months, the Journal reported. Recent strikes used longer-range missiles and drones, a US official said, indicating an upgrade. Attacks damaged a US diplomatic and logistics hub at Baghdad airport.
• Iranian resupply: Current and former US officials and defense experts said Tehran renewed support for Iraqi militias after the US bombing campaign in Iran began in February. A US official said the flow of small arms, drones and short-range rockets slowed while Tehran fought the US, then ramped up this summer.
• Regional spillover: Saudi Arabia said a drone attack launched this month from Iraq near the Iranian border temporarily closed its East-West oil pipeline, a route that gained importance after Iran disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The refusal: Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesman for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, a US-designated terrorist group, said forced disarmament “will not happen.” He said his faction and other militias hold senior ministry posts and dozens of parliament seats, and helped produce the government through post-election negotiations.
• Partial compliance: Maj. Gen. Saad Maan, an Iraqi military spokesman, said some factions had handed in weapons and others plan to. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, another US-designated group, said it would work with the government. David Schenker, a former assistant secretary of state, assessed that such groups want sanctions relief.
• The balance of force: Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service, the US-trained unit that fought ISIS, commanded roughly 14,000 soldiers as of 2024, fewer than the militias, whose members number in the tens of thousands. The army collapsed against ISIS in 2014. Victoria Taylor, a former senior State Department official, called disarmament within months impossible.
• The kidnapping risk: The US Embassy in Baghdad now issues about two security warnings a week concerning kidnapping. American freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson was seized in Baghdad in late March by militiamen believed tied to Kataib Hezbollah and released about a week later after negotiations with the government, US officials said.
• The premier: Zaidi, 41, a businessman who had never held public office before becoming prime minister in May, owns a bank, an insurance company and media and construction firms. The Treasury barred his bank from dollar transactions in 2024 over suspected financing of Iran and its proxies; Zaidi denied knowledge of such transactions.

Background:

The withdrawal follows a Biden-era agreement with the previous Iraqi prime minister to remove American troops by 2026. The US invaded in 2003 over Bush administration claims of weapons of mass destruction, later proven false. Close to 4,500 American troops and as many as 300,000 Iraqis were killed.

Between the lines:

Taylor assessed that the militias exist because Iran finds continued utility in them as leverage against Baghdad and Washington, and that this will persist after the troops leave. The structural facts support her: groups that reject disarmament sit inside the ministries and parliament that selected Zaidi, while the state force meant to confront them is smaller than they are. A deadline pushed to next year changes the calendar, not the balance.

What’s next

Watch whether Zaidi formally extends the disarmament deadline, whether more factions follow Asaib Ahl al-Haq in cooperating, and whether attacks on the Baghdad embassy and Erbil consulate continue after the base closure.

The post US closes last Iraq base as militia disarmament deadline slips appeared first on Ontime+.