The latest:

Dozens of Israeli Air Force fighter jets and refueling aircraft flew more than 800 miles to the edge of Iranian airspace on Monday, according to Israeli and U.S. officials cited by Axios. The aircraft tracked a flight path consistent with a potential strike on Iran before turning around short of the border. The operation came a week before Israel’s election.

Details:

• The route: The formation passed through Syrian and Iraqi airspace on a corridor consistent with an actual strike package against Iran, according to the sources cited by Axios. As the jets neared the Iranian border they reversed course and returned to Israel. No Israeli figure has publicly detailed how long the aircraft remained airborne.
• The framing: Israel notified Washington in advance and described the mission as a training exercise for “power projection,” the sources said, aimed at deterring Iran from attacking before the vote. Some Israeli and U.S. officials said the sortie was not unusual.
• The U.S. read: U.S. officials said the Israelis knew Iranian air defenses would detect the aircraft. Some U.S. sources told Axios they came away with the impression Israel hoped Iran would open fire on the jets, which would supply a justification for launching strikes against Iranian targets.
• The risk: Officials cited by Axios said the operation could have produced a miscalculation, drawing an Iranian response and reigniting the war between the two countries. That assessment was attributed to Israeli and American officials rather than to any formal military evaluation.
• The timing: The sortie fell on the same day Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Israel’s Ovda Air Base, though officials said the flight was not connected to the visit. Israel votes on Oct. 27.
• The earlier debate: Axios reported last week that Netanyahu and President Trump discussed in early October a major new operation against Iran before the Israeli and U.S. elections. Netanyahu cited Israeli intelligence indicating Iran was taking steps to reconstitute its nuclear program. Trump ultimately rejected the proposal.
• The military objection: IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir told Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine that restarting the war in that window could force a postponement of the Israeli elections, since Iran would probably retaliate, the sources said. An Israeli official added that Zamir will not permit unjustified military activity capable of undermining the Oct. 27 vote.
• Netanyahu’s words: At a military graduation ceremony Wednesday, Netanyahu said Iran’s supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei had decided to follow his father’s path and allowed Iranian scientists to advance toward a weapon. He said the only way to remove the threat was to overthrow the Iranian regime, calling it the directive he gave the IDF, Mossad and security agencies.
• Other coverage: Fox News reported on Tuesday that the Israeli Air Force conducted a drill toward Iran, without describing the route or the number of aircraft involved.

Background:

Israel and Iran fought a direct war whose resumption both the sortie and the October talks could have triggered, according to the officials cited by Axios. Netanyahu has since told Trump that Iranian steps to rebuild the nuclear program concern him.

Between the lines:

Three facts sit uncomfortably together: a strike-shaped flight path, Israeli awareness that Iranian radars would see it, and an election eight days away. Zamir’s reported warning that war would delay the vote, and his stated refusal to allow unjustified operations, point to a gap between the political and military leaderships over how far deterrence messaging should go before Oct. 27.

What’s next

Watch for any Iranian military or diplomatic response to the sortie, further Israeli air activity before the Oct. 27 vote, and whether Trump revisits the operation Netanyahu proposed in October.

The post Axios: Israeli jets crossed Iraqi airspace to Iran’s border, officials say appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Iraqi crude is set to move overland to a Mediterranean port by lorry starting in mid-October, under a route Syria has agreed to provide, Bloomberg reported Friday. Yousef Qiblawy, chief executive of state-owned Syrian Petroleum, said the agreement between Baghdad and Damascus is almost complete and that exports should begin as soon as possible.

Details:

• The arrangement: Iraq requested assistance from Syrian authorities to move crude products by lorry to a Mediterranean port, Bloomberg reported, citing Qiblawy, who said the first chain of trucks is expected to arrive by mid-October. He gave no final signing date, no export volumes, no pricing terms and did not name the receiving port.
• The quote: Qiblawy told Bloomberg that Iraqi oil exports are expected to “start as soon as possible”, describing the deal between the two governments as almost done.
• What came before: The plan follows energy coordination in late September, when Iraq began importing petrol through Syria. An Iraqi Oil Ministry official told The National a first cargo of 32,000 tonnes of petrol was being unloaded at the Baniyas refinery for onward transport to Iraq by lorry.
• The fuel oil precedent: Syria became the main route for Iraqi fuel oil exports in April, partially offsetting shipment disruption caused by the war in Iran. At least 2.1 million tonnes of Iraqi fuel oil have moved by lorry to Baniyas since then, according to the report.
• Why it matters to Baghdad: Iraq, Opec’s second-largest producer, draws at least 90 per cent of its revenue from oil. Roughly 3.3 million barrels a day crossed the Strait of Hormuz from its southern Basra terminals before the war, leaving the bulk of state income exposed to a single waterway.
• The chokepoint: About a fifth of the world’s energy exports passed through the Strait of Hormuz before the war, and it remains a flashpoint in the eight-month conflict. Iraq has faced one of its most serious economic and security situations since fighting broke out in February.
• The flow data: The seven-day moving average for Gulf crude exports stood at 18.3 million barrels per day on September 30, against an average 18 million bpd in the 12 months before the war, according to ship-tracking firm Kpler. The figures cover Hormuz, the Red Sea and other methods.
• The shipping shift: Last Sunday, the state-owned Iraqi Oil Tankers Company moved two million barrels of its own crude beyond the Strait of Hormuz for the first time in decades. Director general Ali Qais said the aim is to shift part of exports away from the free-on-board Basra model toward better pricing.
• The refining gap: Despite its scale as a crude producer, Iraq faces petrol shortages tied to refinery problems and the management of its energy infrastructure. Qais said the tanker company is also in talks to buy specialised crude tankers and compete with regional peers.
• The Washington angle: The agreements mark a deepening of Baghdad-Damascus ties as the United States pushes for closer relations between the two countries, according to the report. Neither government has detailed the commercial terms or the duration of the transit arrangements.

Between the lines:

Trucking crude is slower and costlier than tanker shipping, so the mid-October convoys read less as a commercial upgrade than as insurance: Iraq is building a second outlet for a revenue stream that is 90 per cent of the budget and almost entirely routed through one strait. The Baniyas fuel oil and petrol flows show the corridor already works in both directions.

What’s next

Watch whether the first truck convoys reach Syria by mid-October and whether Baghdad and Damascus formally sign the agreement. Also watch Kpler’s Gulf export averages and any move by the Iraqi Oil Tankers Company to purchase its own tankers.

Sources:

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The latest:

Assets seized from businessmen tied to the ousted Assad regime have been moved into a state-owned fund that now sits at the centre of Syria’s economic reconstruction, the Financial Times reported. The Syrian Sovereign Fund, created last year by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, controls factories, malls, real estate and bank stakes. It reports directly to the presidency and is chaired by the tourism minister.

Details:

• The valuation: Syria’s finance minister put the fund’s assets at $50bn last year, according to the FT, but the fund has not disclosed its holdings, revenues or finances. It says its businesses employ more than 40,000 workers and that it has over 270 staff of its own.
• The director: Three people who met him identified the fund’s director as Ibrahim Succarieh, a Lebanese-Australian citizen who does not appear on the fund’s website. Succarieh is under Australian sanctions over his alleged membership of the al-Qaeda affiliate that preceded Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
• The fund’s answer: The fund declined to answer questions on its assets, revenues, management and transparency. It said it is building governance step by step as a new institution and working towards alignment with international practices for sovereign wealth funds, with the stated goal of protecting and growing state-owned assets.
• The seizures: A state committee on illegally obtained assets said the fund helped manage 32 entities in trade, services and banking formerly belonging to Assad-era businessman Samer Foz, plus a Damascus mall taken from Mohammad and Wassim Qattan. Foz and Wassim Qattan were sanctioned by Washington and Europe for backing Assad.
• The disputes: The fund has struggled to re-register ownership of some confiscated companies, while owners dispossessed under Assad have sought to reclaim stakes and some former proprietors have contested the seizures, people familiar with the matter said. The Damascus governorate said the fund settled with the mall’s original developer.
• Foreign deals: Inbound agreements include a $7bn real estate project with Emirati developer Arada, deals with Turkey’s Tiryaki Agro and Saudi Arabia’s Riyadh Cables Group, and a 25% stake in a Syrian entity created by Kuwait’s Zain, which won a $747mn mobile licence. The fund also launched a payments company working with Visa.
• The real estate arm: The property unit is headed by Mohamad al-Khayyat of the Syrian-Qatari billionaire family that has worked closely with the Trump family and the White House. The fund holds land directly and manages public land for government departments, sometimes brokering deals and taking a cut of revenues, one person with direct knowledge said.
• The assessment: Thaer Laham of the Syrian Business Council called the fund the most impactful economic actor and the wealthiest entity in Syria for now. One person doing business with it said: “What’s the state today? It’s the ministries and the fund.”
• The criticism: Jihad Yazigi, editor of the Syria Report, said an opaque entity managing such sums with no officially named chief executive raises many question marks and will not build trust between citizen and state. He argued Gulf investors may find it convenient to deal with a body that bypasses red tape.

Background:

Assad was overthrown by a rebel offensive led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, whose leader Ahmed al-Sharaa became president. The new authorities inherited an economy wrecked by war and sanctions, and have made attracting Gulf capital central to reconstruction.

Between the lines:

The fund’s leverage runs beyond ownership: by holding assets in every sector and deciding who operates and invests in them, its officials shape access to the economy itself. Yazigi’s point cuts both ways — the same opacity that undermines domestic trust removes bureaucratic friction for Gulf investors, which may explain why Damascus has not rushed to publish its books.

What’s next

Watch whether the fund discloses its holdings or names its director publicly, progress on Arada’s 11,000-unit New Damascus project, and how contested ownership claims from dispossessed former proprietors are resolved.

The post Syria channels seized Assad-era assets into opaque $50bn state fund appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

Ballistic missiles and explosive-laden drones struck Aden’s international airport on Wednesday, Yemen’s Transport Ministry said, with one missile landing near the runway minutes before a Cairo flight was due to arrive. Hours later, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia had asked Syria to send troops to fight the Iran-aligned group, a request Damascus is weighing against its policy of avoiding regional wars.

Details:

• The Saudi request: A US official and a Syrian military official briefed on the matter told Reuters that Riyadh asked Damascus to deploy forces against the Houthis. Options range from defensive aid protecting the kingdom from missile and drone attacks to an offensive deployment supporting Saudi-backed Yemeni troops on the ground.
• Damascus response: A Syrian diplomat said Syria stood firmly with Saudi Arabia against Houthi attacks, but that the government’s priority was domestic recovery from the civil war. Any military cooperation would run exclusively through official channels under existing bilateral agreements, the diplomat said. No decision has been announced.
• The Riyadh visit: Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh on Tuesday and discussed possible Syrian military assistance, the US official said. Syrian state media footage showed Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman, who has overseen the Yemen file, escorting Sharaa back to his plane.
• Why Damascus hesitates: The Syrian state is still assembling an army from former rebel militias and containing tensions with minorities including Alawites. A war against the Houthis, adherents of another Shi’ite offshoot, could carry divisive religious undertones that Damascus and its Western partners want to avoid, the US official said.
• The precedent: Syria previously rejected a US request to help fight Hezbollah in Lebanon. Involvement against the Houthis could also be read as hostile by Iran, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, groups the former rebels now governing Damascus fought during the civil war.
• The incentive: Sharaa is keen to show support for a crown prince who helped him gain international legitimacy, including by brokering a May 2025 meeting with US President Donald Trump. Saudi Arabia has provided financial assistance to Syria, and a show of support could increase it, the US official said.
• The battlefield: Fighting is concentrated in Dhubab district overlooking Bab el-Mandeb, with pro-government forces pushing into hills east of the coastal plain, Yemeni military and government sources said. The government claimed Monday it had reached Mocha, a claim military officials on the ground and analysts called premature.
• Saudi casualties: Saudi civil aviation authorities said one person was killed and eight wounded in an attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport, and two killed and 28 wounded at Abha airport facilities. Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the group targeted King Khalid with several drones.
• Allied support: The Saudi-led coalition said it intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile north of Riyadh and was tracking the launch platform over Houthi-held Sanaa. Turkey is sending mainly defensive and technical support, two officials said, after Ankara and Pakistan pledged collective defence under their new alliance.
• Humanitarian toll: More than 200,000 people have been displaced since the latest fighting began, the International Organization for Migration said Wednesday, with Director General Amy Pope calling for more funding for food and shelter. The UN says three in four families in parts of Yemen are going hungry.

Background:

The Houthis seized Sanaa in 2014, prompting a Saudi-led intervention. The coalition accuses Iran of arming, training and funding the group; the Houthis deny being an Iranian proxy and say they build their own weapons. Tehran rejects the allegations. Bab el-Mandeb has gained weight as US-Iran fighting restricted the Strait of Hormuz.

Between the lines:

Analyst H.A. Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute told Reuters a small Syrian defensive deployment plus anti-drone technical support would be powerfully symbolic, but that Syrian boots on the ground is a different proposition Damascus would avoid. That reading matches the diplomat’s framing, which stressed official channels and domestic priorities without ruling cooperation out.

What’s next

Whether the Yemeni government counteroffensive near Mocha and Dhubab holds, any Syrian decision announced through the bilateral channels Damascus named, and further Houthi strikes on Saudi airports or Aden.

The post Syria weighs sending forces to Saudi Arabia as Houthis strike Saudi airports appeared first on Ontime+.

The Golan Heights are an inseparable and eternal part of Israel, Defense Minister Israel Katz said, rejecting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s statement that the plateau is Syrian land. Katz added that the Israeli army will not withdraw from the buffer zone it has controlled inside Syria since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in 2024, and vowed to act as needed to stop Syria becoming a threat.

Details:

• The Israeli position: Katz said in a statement that Israel will not leave Mount Hermon or the security zone, territory he tied to the 1973 war and handed back to Syria under the 1974 disengagement agreement. He argued the agreement’s terms were violated once Syria became, in his words, an Iranian base.
• The condition set: Israel will stay on Mount Hermon and in the security zone as long as there is a jihadist threat to the border and Israeli communities, Katz said, naming both Syrian government security forces and other armed groups. He set no timeline and named no withdrawal mechanism.
• The legal backdrop: Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, but most of the international community continues to regard the plateau as Syrian territory, according to The Times of Israel. That gap turns Sharaa’s assertion of sovereignty into a live diplomatic dispute rather than a rhetorical one.
• Jordan’s warning: King Abdullah II told the UN General Assembly on September 22 that this Israeli government’s appetite has become a regional threat, and that Syria is the alarm bell. He accused Israel of repeated incursions, gradual territorial expansion and new military positions, including around vital water resources.
• The Jordanian read: The king said Israel is testing step by step how far it can expand, pushing at legal boundaries, according to The Jerusalem Post. Amman framed its criticism around regional strategy this time rather than its usual files of Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank.
• Amman’s interests: Jordan hosted close to a million Syrian refugees during Assad’s rule and faced Iranian-backed drug smuggling across the border. It sees the new Damascus government as a stabilization opportunity, and believes smuggling still originates from Suwayda under networks inherited from the old regime.
• The friction point: Israel is pushing to demilitarize southern Syria and has backed the Druze in Suwayda, some of whom have floated their own state in the south and an alliance with Israel, per The Jerusalem Post. Jordan views that prospect with concern.
• Wider strikes: Israel has bombed Damascus and, more recently, a military base in northern Syria, while warning Turkey against intervening, The Jerusalem Post reported. Israeli officials have publicly threatened the new Syrian government, and talk in Jerusalem includes a possible future confrontation with Turkey over Syria.
• The regional shift: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey now assess that Israel is filling the vacuum left by Iran’s retreat, and view it as a potential threat on balance-of-power terms, according to The Jerusalem Post. That marks a reversal from the Abraham Accords period.

Background:

Israeli forces entered the buffer zone on December 8, 2024, as Assad’s government collapsed, and have kept up strikes on Syrian territory since. The 1974 disengagement agreement that governed the line for five decades is now effectively suspended.

Between the lines:

The Jerusalem Post assesses that Jordan’s UN intervention signals a broader regional recalculation rather than a routine complaint. Amman’s stakes are domestic: northern Jordanians have historic ties to southern Syria, and the kingdom fears a security vacuum there produces extremist groups and smuggling it cannot contain. Katz’s open-ended condition for staying gives Jordan no horizon for the stabilization it wants in Damascus.

What’s next

Watch for a Syrian government response to Katz, any move toward a new security arrangement replacing the 1974 agreement, and further Israeli strikes inside Syria. Jordan is expected to hold its position pending the upcoming Israeli elections.

The post Katz: Golan is eternally Israeli, no pullback from Syria buffer zone appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa said Tuesday that Israel must withdraw from positions taken in southern Syria after Bashar Assad’s government fell in December 2024 before the sides negotiate broader security arrangements, outlining a sequence he said could lead to “lasting peace.” Speaking at an Atlantic Council panel in New York before his scheduled United Nations General Assembly address, al-Sharaa said direct Syrian-Israeli talks with US involvement had reached “almost 90%” agreement at one stage over the past year.

Details

• Withdrawal sequence: Al-Sharaa called for Israel to return to positions tied to the 1974 disengagement agreement. “Then we get into discussions on security arrangements,” he said, adding that successful arrangements could lead to lasting peace. The central divide pits Damascus’s demand for withdrawal first against Israel’s emphasis on security conditions after Assad’s fall.
• Golan dispute: Al-Sharaa said the Golan Heights were Syrian territory under UN recognition and “there is no discussion.” Israel captured the territory in the 1967 Six-Day War and extended Israeli law there in 1981. The United States recognized Israeli sovereignty in 2019, while the UN continues to regard it as occupied Syrian territory.
• Competing security cases: Al-Sharaa acknowledged the trauma of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack but rejected allowing it to determine broader Israeli policy toward Syria. He cited more than 70,000 deaths in Gaza and questioned Israeli bombings, arrests, and strikes on Syrian airports and military sites. Israeli officials describe operations in Syria as necessary to block armed groups, weapons transfers, and an October 7-style attack from Syrian territory.
• Regional repositioning: Al-Sharaa pointed to Syria’s growing relationships with the United States, Britain, Gulf states, Iraq, and Lebanon, saying the unsuccessful relationship was with Israel. “I believe the problem is with Israel, not with Syria,” he said. He also pledged institution-building and constitutional recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights.
• Economic opening: He called for “mutual respect and good economic and trade relations.” A stable southern Syria could facilitate regional infrastructure, trade, and energy links involving Israel, Jordan, Gulf states, and Turkey, supporting Damascus’s push to rebuild its war- and sanctions-damaged economy.
• Foreign forces: Al-Sharaa said his long-term objective was a Syria without foreign military bases and that negotiations continued over Russia’s remaining military presence. Any security arrangement would also depend on mechanisms addressing violations, armed-group activity, threats from Syrian territory, and unilateral Israeli operations.

What’s next

Al-Sharaa’s scheduled address to the UN General Assembly is the next public marker. The decisive negotiating indicator will be whether Israel and Syria can agree on withdrawal sequencing, monitoring violations, and guarantees against cross-border threats or continued unilateral operations.

The post Al-Sharaa Conditions Israel Security Deal on Southern Withdrawal appeared first on Ontime+.

Israeli citizenship applications from Golan Druze surged to 3,750 in 2025, up from 500-600 a year between 2022 and 2024, according to interior ministry figures cited by The Times of Israel. Community figures tie the shift to two mass killings: a Hezbollah rocket strike on a Majdal Shams football pitch in July 2024, and the Suwayda bloodshed of July 2025.

Details:

• The numbers: Applications among Golan Druze first rose in 2021 and held at 500-600 annually through 2024, The Times of Israel reported, before reaching 3,750 in 2025. Interior ministry data show that as of March 2026, roughly 40% of Druze in the four Golan towns are naturalized citizens.
• The first tragedy: An Iranian-made Falaq-1 rocket fired by Hezbollah hit a football pitch in Majdal Shams on the evening of July 27, 2024, killing 12 Druze children. Adham Safadi, a Red Star of David paramedic who lost his 11-year-old daughter Fenis, said the town’s bomb shelter left children six seconds to reach safety.
• The second tragedy: Fighting erupted in Syria’s Suwayda province in July 2025 between Druze residents and Bedouin tribes. Forces sent by President Ahmad al-Sharaa were accused of siding with the tribes and carrying out mass killings. Residents now call it the Druze October 7.
• Conflicting tolls: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights put the Suwayda death toll above 2,000 over several days, including 789 Druze civilians, while a committee formed by the Syrian government reported documenting 1,760 killed. Government forces and allied fighters were accused of executing civilians.
• Israel’s response: Druze leaders in Israel pressed the government to intervene. Israel carried out airstrikes on southern Syria and Damascus with the declared aim of forcing the attacking forces to withdraw. Druze in a Galilee village set up an operations room to organize medicine and food shipments into Syria.
• The separatist call: Syrian Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri last month renewed his call for the minority to break from Syria and form a union with Israel, saying Israel is the only state capable of preventing another bloodbath. Druze make up roughly 3% of Syria’s population.
• Sharaa’s pledges: After the Suwayda violence, Sharaa vowed to hold perpetrators accountable and reaffirmed his commitment to minority rights. In June he said Syria was working toward a security arrangement with Israel that could eventually lead to full peace. Washington last month removed Syria from its state sponsors of terrorism list.
• The distrust: Safadi dismissed those pledges, describing Sharaa as “a wolf in a suit.” Lorena Kizel Khatib, chief executive of the Druze organization Together We Are Responsible for One Another, called the Suwayda bloodshed the single most powerful catalyst for the community’s shift.
• Divided families: Israel’s 1967 capture of the plateau and its 1981 annexation split families across a hostile border and a UN-patrolled buffer zone. Druze students attended university in Damascus until the 2011 civil war, marriages were arranged across the line, and Golan apples crossed under special arrangements.
• Military service: Safadi said young Druze now volunteer for the army and police, jobs requiring citizenship. In March, Master Sergeant Maher Khatar, 38, of the combat engineering corps was killed near a post in southern Lebanon alongside Sergeant Or Demri, in the town’s first military funeral.

Background:

Majdal Shams, home to 29,000 people, is the largest of four Druze towns in the Golan alongside Masada, Ein Qiniyye and Buqata. The Druze faith, which broke from Shia Islam in the 11th century, rejects converts and holds that communities stay loyal to the state where they live.

Between the lines:

The loyalty question has been replaced by a protection question, in Kizel Khatib’s framing. Both catalysts came from actors tied to Damascus: Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad’s closest ally, and forces under his successor. That leaves no Syrian authority the community associates with safety, even as most families still hope to reunite with relatives across the buffer zone.

What’s next

Watch whether the security arrangement Sharaa described in June advances, whether the US-brokered Israel-Lebanon framework signed June 26 produces a final deal, and whether 2026 citizenship applications hold at 2025 levels.

The post Can Golan Druze Trade Damascus for an Israeli Alliance? appeared first on Ontime+.

The latest:

A post-war Middle East strategy is being drafted inside the Trump administration to guide US policy after the war with Iran and through the president’s final two years, Axios reported, citing two US officials and two other sources familiar with the discussions. The framework rests on three ambitions: containing Tehran, settling conflicts left open since Oct. 7, 2023, and widening normalization toward a Saudi-Israeli deal.

Details:

• The Iran pillar: According to the sources cited by Axios, the administration is weighing a regional alignment of US partners designed to contain Tehran, with Washington acting as guarantor. That would turn the end of the current war into an attempt to build a different security architecture around Iran, rather than a return to the previous regional balance.
• The unfinished files: The second pillar covers business left open from the last two years. Washington wants to advance the next phase of Trump’s Gaza plan, secure a security agreement between Israel and Syria, and implement the Israel-Lebanon agreement, according to Axios.
• The normalization track: The third pillar is expanding the Abraham Accords and pursuing Saudi-Israeli normalization, described in the report as potentially the most politically transformative element. Axios said the emerging plan could culminate in a Saudi-Israeli agreement, without setting out a timetable.
• Trump’s own framing: Axios reported that Trump has already held two meetings with senior advisers on the strategy, and that in private conversations he has spoken of working on “something much bigger” in the Middle East after the Iran war. The White House declined to comment.
• The election calendar: The administration is planning around political uncertainty in Israel, where elections are scheduled for Oct. 27, followed by the US midterms in November. Washington hopes the next Israeli government will cooperate with the strategy, according to the report.
• Proceeding regardless: Some US officials said Trump intends to move ahead whatever the Israeli result, including in the event of political deadlock, Axios reported. That would decouple the strategy’s timetable from the formation of a stable governing coalition in Israel.
• The stated caveats: A source briefed on the process cautioned that it remains unclear whether all US allies in the region will support the emerging framework. The strategy itself is expected to take several more weeks to draft, according to Axios.
• What is not settled: No Arab states have been identified as joining the proposed alignment against Iran, and the security guarantees Washington would offer as guarantor have not been spelled out. No date has been attached to any of the three pillars.

Background:

The conflicts the plan seeks to close — Gaza, the Israel-Syria file and the Israel-Lebanon agreement — all stem from the escalation that followed Oct. 7, 2023. The Abraham Accords, signed during Trump’s first term, never extended to Saudi Arabia.

Between the lines:

The three pillars are presented as one design, but each depends on a different actor’s consent: Gulf partners on Iran containment, an unformed Israeli government on the regional files, and Riyadh on normalization. The caution reported by Axios — that allied support is not assured and drafting needs weeks more — suggests Washington currently holds a concept rather than an agreed regional order. The war with Iran has begun to redraw the geopolitical map that preceded it. In the Gulf, the UAE is emerging as a rising political and military power, no longer defined primarily by its economic weight, after pursuing a dual strategy of deterrence and diplomacy toward Iran.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has increasingly looked beyond the Gulf for broader strategic alignments, while Egypt’s regional influence has receded. Iran faces a different trajectory. The pressure of war is pushing Tehran toward a more inward-looking posture, even as its regional proxies display a growing degree of autonomy in their decision-making — potentially loosening a network of influence that Tehran spent decades building. Further west, Syria is making a tentative return to the regional map, this time as a potential alternative trade corridor. Lebanon, meanwhile, is approaching a potentially decisive shift as Hezbollah’s position weakens and the regional order that sustained its power edges closer to an end.

What’s next

Israel’s Oct. 27 elections and the US midterms in November are the two dated checkpoints. Watch for the completed strategy document, expected in several weeks, and for any public response from Gulf capitals on the normalization track.

Source:

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The latest

Kurdish politics is entering a profound transition as the PKK ends more than four decades of armed struggle, the Syrian Democratic Forces dissolves into Syrian state structures, and a US support agreement for Iraq’s Peshmerga nears expiry. The parallel developments do not erase the Kurdish question. They move citizenship, constitutional recognition, language rights, political participation, local government and institutional strength to the centre of struggles long shaped by weapons and foreign protection.

Details

• Turkey’s transition: On February 27, 2025, imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan called for the organization to disarm and dissolve. Following its 12th congress in May, the PKK announced the end of its organizational structure and armed campaign. The Turkey-PKK conflict has killed more than 40,000 people since the 1980s. In July, 30 fighters symbolically burned their weapons near Sulaimani in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.
• Legal pathway: A multiparty commission examined the legal basis for disarmament and reintegration. Turkish lawmakers approved a reform roadmap in February 2026, then passed the Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration in August by 468 votes to 88, with six abstentions. It created procedures for disarmed PKK members to return to civilian life and mechanisms to suspend some prosecutions and sentences.
• Syria integration: SDF commander Mazloum Abdi announced on August 25 that the Kurdish-led force had ended its mission as an independent military organization after integration into state institutions. The YPG entered the state military framework, while commander Sipan Hamo became deputy defence minister for eastern territories. President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed Abdi a presidential adviser on August 28.
• Constitutional stakes: More than 20,000 employees from the Kurdish-led northeastern administration transferred into Syrian state structures. Before dissolution, SDF officials said about 99% of outstanding issues with Damascus had been resolved. Abdi called for Kurdish rights in the new constitution. Syrian authorities recognized Kurdish as an official language, made Nowruz a national holiday and restored citizenship to previously deprived Kurds.
• Iraq’s umbrella: American, British, French and German forces withdrew hundreds of personnel and important air-defence assets from Erbil International Airport in a 72-hour pullout. The US support memorandum for the Peshmerga expires September 30. Ministry officials had received no formal notice of either extension or termination and expected talks with American commanders before the deadline. Expiry would require a new arrangement.
• Peshmerga reform: US support has also been tied to unifying formations historically aligned with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The memorandum set September 2026 as the deadline for placing forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. Unlike the PKK and SDF processes, Iraq’s trajectory is from party-based forces toward a unified, constitutionally recognized institution.

What’s next

Talks with American commanders before September 30 will determine the next Peshmerga support arrangement, followed by the September 2026 deadline for unifying forces under the ministry.

The post Kurdish Politics Moves From Arms to Citizenship appeared first on Ontime+.

The Syrian Democratic Forces will cease to exist as an independent military force, commander Mazloum Abdi announced Tuesday from the presidential palace in Damascus, alongside the dissolution of the Kurdish self-administration and their full absorption into state institutions. State television carried his remarks. Abdi said the group’s mission had ended and framed the move as a transition from the era of weapons to the era of peace, according to Agence France-Presse and SANA.

Details:

• The announcement: Abdi told reporters: “Today we announce the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and we announce with full responsibility its dissolution as an independent military force.” He added that Kurds sought a genuine transition from arms to peace, according to Syrian state television.
• The agreement: Damascus announced a comprehensive deal with the SDF on 29 January 2026, including a ceasefire, the start of military and administrative integration, and guarantees for displaced residents to return. Washington, which maintains close ties with both sides, described the accord as a historic milestone, according to AFP.
• The military backdrop: The deal followed a Syrian army operation that recovered wide areas in the north and northeast, launched after Damascus said the SDF had violated an earlier accord reached in March 2025. The SDF pulled back from Arab-majority districts to Kurdish-majority areas in its Hasakah stronghold.
• Kurdish rights decree: Al-Sharaa issued a decree on 16 January recognizing Kurdish national rights and making Kurdish an official language, a step AFP described as unprecedented in Syria since independence in 1946. Abdi said al-Sharaa pledged to preserve Kurdish-language education and showed openness on mother-tongue instruction.
• Appointments: Under the accord, al-Sharaa appointed Nour al-Din Ahmed Issa, a Kurd from Qamishli, as governor of Hasakah the following month. In March, the Defense Ministry named prominent Kurdish commander Sipan Hamo as deputy defense minister for the Eastern Region.
• Assets transferred: Syrian authorities took over facilities previously under Kurdish control, most notably Qamishli airport and the oil and gas fields of the northeast. US forces moved more than 5,700 detained Islamic State members from Kurdish custody to neighboring Iraq.
• The US shift: Washington led the anti-IS coalition and was the Kurds’ main backer until the group’s territorial defeat in 2019. After Bashar al-Assad’s removal in late 2024, it became a principal supporter of al-Sharaa’s unification effort, and envoy Tom Barrack said the SDF’s counter-IS role had ended.
• The numbers: Founded in October 2015 by merging Arab and Kurdish fighters under coalition guidance, the SDF fielded close to 100,000 members before the old government fell, per Abdi. Researcher Fabrice Balanche put the remaining force near 50,000 after most Arab fighters sided with the new authorities.
• The unresolved file: Kurdish-language education topped Abdi’s talks with al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. An informed source said Abdi would seek full translation of curricula into Kurdish, while the government favors optional Kurdish instruction of one to three weekly classes, on the Turkish model.
• The delegation: A military, security and administrative delegation reached Damascus on Monday led by Abdi and Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the self-administration’s foreign relations department, with Women’s Protection Units commander Nowruz Ahmed and eastern region deputy defense aide Samir Ousso.

Background:

Kurds number roughly 2 million of Syria’s 20 million people and faced decades of marginalization: bans on teaching their language, celebrating their festivals, and stripped citizenship for tens of thousands. After 2011 they avoided fighting Assad’s forces and built a self-administration over oil-rich, fertile territory taken from IS.

Between the lines:

Kurdish affairs expert Mutlu Civiroglu told AFP the dissolution is a major achievement for al-Sharaa, removing one of the main obstacles to central government authority and to the legitimacy of his presidency. The Kurds enter this stage without the autonomy they long sought and without their former US patron, holding instead a language decree, two senior appointments and a promise on schooling — commitments that now depend on a constitution not yet written.

What’s next

Watch the education formula: whether curricula are translated in full or Kurdish becomes optional weekly classes. Also pending are a meeting between Women’s Protection Units commanders and the Defense Ministry, and command assignments across Hasakah.

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