What happened
At the height of the regional war that erupted after the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian delivered remarks in a tone different from the one prevailing in Tehran since the confrontation began.
Pezeshkian said the temporary leadership council had decided not to attack neighbouring countries unless attacks on Iran were launched from their territory. He then went further by apologising to the countries that had been subjected to Iranian attacks and stressing that Tehran did not want to attack its neighbours.
But that course did not hold for long.
Hours later, official Iranian messaging returned to its familiar formulation: Iran had not struck neighbouring countries as countries, but had instead targeted American bases and facilities used in attacks against it. Here, the contradiction became unmistakable: if Tehran had not attacked its neighbours in the first place, why was an apology issued? And if the apology reflected an implicit acknowledgment that damage had occurred on their territory, why did other institutions quickly move to deny the idea politically?
Quick background
1.The current war broke out after the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, 2026.
2.Tehran responded by launching waves of missiles and drones across a broad regional arc that included Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan and Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region.
3.Gulf states and Washington described what happened as attacks that struck the territory of sovereign states and caused civilian and material damage.
4.By contrast, Tehran insisted that its operations had targeted American assets or sites linked to the attack on Iran, not the host countries themselves.
5.These developments came at an exceptionally sensitive transitional moment inside the Iranian system after the killing of Ali Khamenei and the formation of a temporary leadership council exercising his powers until a new Supreme Leader is chosen.
Where does the contradiction appear?
1. Pezeshkian: an apology, then a return to the language of justification
Pezeshkian delivered the clearest message in favour of de-escalation. He said his country did not want to target its neighbours, and that a decision had been taken to stop such attacks unless the territory of those states was used against Iran.
This formulation carries 3 direct implications:
1.An implicit acknowledgment that what happened did indeed affect neighbouring countries.
2.A political attempt to contain Gulf anger.
3.A signal that the presidency, or part of the temporary council, wants to open a window for de-escalation.
But later, Pezeshkian’s own tone returned to the defensive narrative: Iran had not targeted neighbouring countries, but American bases inside them. This adjustment is not a mere linguistic detail. It marks a shift from a political apology to partial sovereign denial.
2. Araghchi and the Foreign Ministry: reinforcing the distinction between the state and the base!
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi followed much the same path, insisting that Iran was not attacking neighbouring states, but rather American bases being used against it, and that there was a major difference between the two.
This formulation serves 2 objectives:
1.Reducing the political cost with Gulf capitals.
2.Preserving the legitimacy of the military response domestically, without appearing to retreat under pressure.
But the problem is that this logic does not erase the impact of the strikes on the ground. When missiles, drones, or their debris fall on the territory of a neighbouring state, the legal distinctions Tehran seeks to construct become less convincing politically and in media terms.
3. The IRGC and the military establishment: no apology, only justification and deterrence!
The line closest to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appeared more hardline. This camp did not move toward apology, but focused instead on the argument that any targeting that took place was linked to American sites or to spaces used in the aggression against Iran.
Here we are faced with a different narrative from Pezeshkian’s initial one:
1.No talk of political regret.
2.No acknowledgment of error or overreach.
3.No readiness to bear the full diplomatic consequences.
4.A firm insistence on the right to respond to any site Tehran sees as part of the war against it.
This divergence opens a central question: was the presidency expressing a coherent institutional decision, or was it trying to produce a path of de-escalation that the military and security establishment had not fully endorsed?
4. The judiciary and the domestic narrative: hardline against weakness, not against war!
Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei did not focus on the language of apology or de-escalation, but rather on the language of protecting the system and showing no leniency toward those who help the enemy, in an internal context already charged with protests and security pressure.
This language distances itself from addressing the attacks on neighbouring states directly, while also distancing itself from the climate of apology. It frames the entire crisis as a battle to defend the system against an external war and internal infiltration.
In other words:
1.The presidency tried to calm the outside.
2.The judiciary stressed internal cohesion.
3.The IRGC focused on the legitimacy of deterrence.
4.The result was a multi-headed discourse.
5. Clerics: ideological mobilisation running against the path of de-escalation!
Some prominent clerics went further in adopting escalatory language against the United States and against the countries viewed in Tehran as having provided an operational environment for strikes against Iran.
This discourse weakens any diplomatic attempt led by Pezeshkian for 2 reasons:
1.It remobilises the conservative base around a logic of open confrontation.
2.It sends a message abroad that the apology is not necessarily the final word inside the system.
Who is actually running the decision-making?
The current scene in Iran cannot be understood only through contradictory statements. The deeper issue is the question of actual authority after Khamenei’s killing.
The country is now being run through a temporary leadership council composed of:
1.President Masoud Pezeshkian.
2.Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei.
3.Cleric Ali Reza Arafi in his capacity as the council’s juristic member.
But the existence of a temporary council does not necessarily mean that decision-making is unified or that all centres of power are moving at the same pace. During war, the military and security establishment, especially the IRGC, retains substantial room for manoeuvre that may exceed the presidency’s ability to impose a single line of messaging.
Here, 4 centres of power now emerge inside Iran:
First: the presidential axis:
It tends toward reducing regional losses, containing Gulf anger, and trying to prevent a widening of political isolation.
Second: the military-security axis:
It wants to preserve the image of deterrence and avoid appearing to retreat, especially after the heavy blows Iran has absorbed.
Third: the judicial-domestic security axis:
It focuses on preventing external disorder from spilling into Iran’s الداخل, and emphasises controlling protests and accusations of treason or collusion.
Fourth: the religious axis:
It seeks to protect the ideological legitimacy of the system and resists any discourse that may appear excessively conciliatory at a moment of war.
(Analysis)
What happened does not look like a slip of the tongue by Pezeshkian, nor merely poor coordination in messaging. The more likely reading is that we are facing 3 simultaneous realities:
1.The presidency wanted to send a genuine signal of de-escalation to the Gulf
That is because Tehran understands that widening the confrontation with neighbouring states will multiply the cost of the war and draw those states even closer to Washington and Israel.
2.The IRGC and the hardline camp refused to let the apology become a political doctrine. In this camp’s logic, an apology in wartime is read as weakness, and could open the door to further external or internal pressure.
3.The temporary council has not yet succeeded in producing a single centre of decision-making
This is the most serious point revealed by the crisis. A system that once rested on a single supreme point of reference is now sending conflicting messages at a moment that requires the highest degree of discipline.
Put directly: Tehran today is not only suffering from the pressures of war, but also from a crisis over who speaks in its final name.
Direct impact
1.Regionally:
The Gulf states received a double message from Iran: an apology on one side, and justification plus continuity in the logic of targeting on the other. This weakens confidence in any swift Iranian commitment.
2.Domestically:
The contradiction gives conservatives material with which to attack Pezeshkian as overly soft, and may narrow his room for manoeuvre inside the temporary council.
3.Militarily:
When political messaging is not unified, controlling the rules of engagement becomes more difficult. This increases the likelihood of further attacks even if conciliatory political statements are issued.
4.In the succession file:
Any confusion in managing the war will also be read as part of the post-Khamenei test: who holds decision-making power, and who appears more capable of preserving the system’s cohesion?
What next?
1.Watch whether Pezeshkian publicly repeats the language of apology and de-escalation, or whether he later confines himself only to the line of targeting American bases.
2.Follow the positions of the IRGC, the judiciary and clerics in the coming days, because they will reveal whether there is an actual decision to restrain attacks on neighbouring states.
3.Track any steps by the temporary council to unify the political and military message, because continued divergence would mean that the crisis of authority in Tehran is deepening.
4.Pay close attention to the process of choosing a new Supreme Leader, as a prolonged transitional period may intensify competition among power centres instead of calming it.
5.Watch Gulf reactions, because the affected capitals will deal with the military facts on the ground more than with Iranian diplomatic formulations.
