The latest:
Up to 11.5 million barrels per day of crude could eventually avoid the Strait of Hormuz if existing pipelines run at full capacity and planned projects are completed, according to official data and industry specialists cited by AFP. Reuters reported Friday that Gulf governments are speeding multibillion-dollar spending on ports, pipelines and railways after months of shipping disruption during the war with Iran.
Details:
- The baseline: Crude exports through Hormuz totalled 14.95 million barrels per day in 2025, according to International Energy Agency data. Iran accounted for about 1.69 million barrels of that, said Andrew Wilson of shipbroker BRS, who expects Tehran to keep relying on the waterway it controls and to maximise shipments to China.
- Saudi capacity: Riyadh was pumping about 2 million barrels daily through its East-West pipeline from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea before the war began in late February, per the IEA. Aramco raised the line’s operating capacity to 7 million barrels daily in March 2025, leaving roughly 5 million barrels of spare capacity.
- The next expansion: Saudi Arabia plans a further East-West expansion of up to 2 million barrels per day, according to a US energy research institute. The institute said the design remains unclear, with no decision disclosed on whether it will upgrade the existing line or build a parallel one. Wilson expects completion around 2030-2031.
- UAE pipelines: The Emirates moved about 1.1 million barrels daily before the war through the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, against a stated capacity of 1.8 million, the IEA said. Abu Dhabi’s media office said a second parallel line, accelerated in May, will double Fujairah export capacity and start next year.
- Ports build-out: Trade is shifting toward Saudi Red Sea ports and the UAE’s east coast, Reuters reported. DP World plans two new container terminals at Fujairah. A ports-sector source told Reuters that terminals had become a critical priority for regional governments, and that Saudi investment focus over the next year or two would be “ports, ports, ports”.
- Iraq and Syria: The US State Department said in July it was working to restart a major pipeline linking Iraqi oilfields to Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with an initial capacity of 2 million barrels daily, and that Washington is overseeing an international coalition on the technical and financial work. No timetable was set; Wilson warned political and investment obstacles could delay it.
- Kuwait and Bahrain: Neither country currently has a pipeline that bypasses Hormuz. Both recently held talks with Saudi Arabia about connecting their facilities to the Saudi network, according to the IEA. Kuwait is also discussing access to Emirati lines, Reuters reported, while Iraq seeks additional export routes via Turkey, Syria and Jordan.
- Land corridors: Oman’s Asyad Logistics and Saudi Arabia’s SPARK Logistics signed a cross-border transport agreement using the direct desert road opened in December 2021, announced by the Saudi transport ministry. The value, shipping volumes and implementation timetable were not disclosed. Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed rail and logistics memorandums in June, including reviving the Hejaz railway and extending it south to Oman.
- Exposure exposed: The disruption laid bare the fragility of Hormuz-dependent economies. Qatar is particularly exposed because its LNG exports ran entirely through the strait before the war, while shipping, aviation, tourism and industrial activity were hit region-wide. Oman is promoting its ports outside Hormuz, including Salalah, Sohar and Duqm.
Background:
Iran’s closure of the strait during the war halted or slowed tanker traffic, forcing exporters that had long treated the waterway as a fixed cost of doing business to revive shelved bypass projects. Total infrastructure spending could eventually reach hundreds of billions of dollars.
Between the lines:
The volumes reroutable today are far smaller than the headline 11.5 million figure: Saudi spare capacity and the Emirati margin are available now, but the Iraq-Syria line has no timetable, the second Saudi expansion is dated around 2030-2031, and rail and road corridors need years to reach scale. Former Atlantic Council fellow Afaq Hussain told Reuters the crisis proved these vulnerabilities are real.
What’s next
Watch the UAE’s second Fujairah pipeline entering service next year, any Saudi decision clarifying the East-West expansion design, and whether Washington’s coalition sets a timetable for the Iraq-Syria line.
