Ahmed Kawah

German political philosopher Carl Schmitt placed the distinction between friend and enemy at the heart of politics. For Schmitt, a state’s political identity rests not merely on its institutions, borders, or interests, but on its ability to recognize those who threaten its security and distinguish them from those with whom it shares common interests.

When a state loses that distinction, its foreign policy risks becoming a series of contradictions, regardless of its wealth, influence, or military strength.

Saudi Arabia now faces precisely this dilemma.

The kingdom’s vital infrastructure and economic interests have repeatedly come under attack from the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Airports, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure have been targeted, threatening the economic foundations of Saudi Arabia’s ambitious development plans.

These are not simply border skirmishes. They are attacks on the arteries of the Saudi economy and the infrastructure underpinning its national transformation.

Saudi officials have accused Iran of encouraging Houthi attacks and continuing to provide the group with weapons and training.

That raises a question Schmitt would have considered fundamental: If a country supports forces attacking your airports, energy facilities, and strategic economic interests, what more must it do before you recognize it as an enemy?

Yet Riyadh’s diplomatic response tells a different story.

Rather than translating that assessment into a clearer strategic position, Saudi Arabia has maintained a remarkably accommodating posture toward Tehran. In July, Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khuraiji traveled to Iran to offer condolences following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. On October 26, Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Tehran as part of a regional delegation seeking a diplomatic way out of the Iranian crisis.

There may be pragmatic calculations behind these visits. Riyadh may reasonably believe that preventing another war serves its national interests.

But diplomacy with an adversary is not the problem. Even enemies negotiate. The problem begins when preserving relations with a threatening power appears to take precedence over confronting the threats themselves.

Schmitt’s distinction does not require a state to declare war on its enemies. It requires the state to understand the nature of the threat and organize its political choices accordingly.

Peace built on a clear understanding of interests and power is fundamentally different from accommodation that allows an adversary to continue its hostile conduct without meaningful consequences.

Saudi Arabia has placed economic transformation at the center of its national future. Protecting that future demands strategic clarity equal to the scale of its ambitions.

A kingdom cannot indefinitely separate the identification of threats from the conduct of its foreign policy.

The greatest danger facing a state is not necessarily an enemy capable of harming it. It is losing the political compass that allows it to distinguish those who threaten its interests from those who protect them.