Ahmed Kawah
For Iran, the question is no longer simply about the defiant rhetoric of resistance and victory. It is about finding a way out of a prolonged military and economic confrontation without making concessions that its leadership would struggle to explain to its own people.
On October 24, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, signaled Tehran’s willingness to resume negotiations with the United States based on the June agreement brokered by Islamabad and Doha. He said Iran had conveyed through the Pakistani mediator its readiness to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an end to the American naval blockade.
The irony is difficult to ignore.
In March, Tehran rejected a 15-point American proposal that included restrictions on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and the reopening of Hormuz. Iran responded with its own demands. Now it is seeking another diplomatic settlement, although there is no indication that it has accepted the American terms it previously dismissed.
Just days earlier, Iran’s leadership had told Pakistani army chief Asim Munir that negotiations with Washington would not resume unless Tehran’s seven demands were met. Yet President Masoud Pezeshkian subsequently called for another attempt at reaching an agreement, even while blaming Washington for the collapse of previous talks.
The contradiction raises an uncomfortable question: What has Iran gained from insisting on conditions it may ultimately be unable to enforce?
Military resistance can demonstrate endurance. It cannot necessarily deliver diplomatic leverage, particularly when economic pressure continues and the country needs relief from the blockade.
The picture, however, is not entirely clear. Iran’s Tasnim news agency cited an Iranian source denying that Tehran had submitted a new proposal exchanging the reopening of Hormuz for the lifting of the American blockade. The source insisted that Iran remained committed to an earlier plan.
These competing accounts leave the precise terms of Tehran’s latest diplomatic initiative uncertain.
The deeper problem is political. Iran’s leadership has spent years presenting resistance to compromise as evidence of strength. It now faces the challenge of turning military endurance into a sustainable diplomatic outcome.
Washington, meanwhile, has little reason to accept an agreement simply because Tehran is prepared to return to negotiations. Fundamental disagreements over nuclear restrictions, sanctions and freedom of navigation remain unresolved.
Iran’s latest diplomatic signals may represent an effort to limit further losses rather than an admission of defeat.
But the central paradox remains: Negotiations once portrayed as an unacceptable concession are now being reconsidered as a possible way out.
The question is no longer whether Iran can continue confronting the United States. It is how much more Iran will pay before accepting the possibility of a settlement it could have negotiated months earlier.