Ahmed Kawah
As American troops leave Iraq, Baghdad sees an opportunity to declare full sovereignty. Many Kurds, however, are looking at the skies: who will protect their cities, airports and oilfields if drones and missiles return? These reactions reflect different assessments of the Iraqi state’s ability to provide security for all its citizens.
Washington announced the completion of its withdrawal on September 30, while pledging continued intelligence assistance and targeted training. Yet the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga Ministry expressed concern about the departure without a replacement defence system. The Kurdish question is therefore practical: what will replace the protection leaving alongside American soldiers?
The Peshmerga can fight on the ground, but cannot independently provide comprehensive air defence. Removing American systems increases the region’s exposure to missile attacks and places greater responsibility on Baghdad to protect strategic infrastructure. That makes cooperation between federal and regional forces more urgent, particularly when threats can cross borders within minutes.
The withdrawal also has political implications. An international partner gives Erbil greater room to negotiate, even without an unconditional American guarantee. As that presence diminishes, Kurdish leaders fear that disputes with Baghdad could become more vulnerable to pressure from armed factions and regional powers. Their concern is about an imbalance of power as much as a possible attack.
Weapons outside state control deepen that uncertainty. The American departure has proceeded while efforts to disarm influential militias remain unresolved. From the perspective of anxious Kurds, an external deterrent is disappearing before Iraqi institutions have demonstrated that they can prevent armed groups from imposing their own decisions.
Islamic State presents another concern. Losing its territory did not eliminate its networks or capacity to exploit security gaps. Reduced access to American military capabilities could complicate efforts against its remaining cells. A resurgence is not inevitable, but effective coordination and reliable intelligence will become even more important.
Kurdish anxiety, however, does not absolve the region’s leadership of responsibility. Efforts to unify the Peshmerga under one ministry must move beyond announcements towards professional command structures. Foreign partnerships cannot indefinitely compensate for internal division, competing party loyalties or weaknesses in institutional planning.
Telling the Kurds that Iraq has regained sovereignty is insufficient. Sovereignty must deliver protection: air defence, intelligence, coordinated security operations and weapons accountable to the state. When those conditions exist, America’s departure can become a transition towards stronger institutions. Until then, the Kurdish question remains legitimate: has the ally left because the danger has passed, or while it still persists?