The latest:
Undersea cables running through the Strait of Hormuz carry less than 1% of the world’s international bandwidth, according to the International Cable Protection Committee, a figure that sits awkwardly beside an Iranian threat to target them. Yadollah Javani, the IRGC’s political deputy, said on Wednesday, October 21, that the cables could become targets if Iranian infrastructure comes under attack.
Details:
- The threat: Javani warned that the United States and its allies hold vast assets and investments in the region, and said Tehran would use all its capabilities to respond to any strike on Iranian infrastructure, including destroying their property. He named the undersea cables crossing Hormuz among the potential targets, according to BBC.
- The numbers: The ICPC counts five active submarine cable segments passing through Hormuz, under 1% of global international bandwidth. TeleGeography identifies three main systems on the route: Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON and Gulf Bridge International. The principal Europe-to-East-Asia data routes run through the Red Sea instead.
- Who depends on them: TeleGeography says the Hormuz cables were routed through Omani waters because of long-standing political considerations and difficulties with Iran. They primarily serve Arab Gulf states, so damage would threaten regional connectivity first. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE all hold alternative land connections.
- Saudi exposure: Saudi Arabia is less dependent on Gulf routes, with most international capacity carried by systems reaching its Red Sea coast, per TeleGeography. Roughly 17 submarine cables cross the broader region, spanning the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab corridors.
- The technical limit: The global internet has no single point of failure. Operators run multiple subsea and terrestrial paths and can reroute traffic during an outage, which may cut speeds, raise latency or disrupt some services without fully disconnecting users. Severing a cable is not the same as cutting off a country.
- Expert assessment: Mehdi Sarimifar, a Canada-based technology specialist, told Iran International that previous IRGC threats against submarine cables were largely rhetorical. He said Iranian calculations last summer used total global submarine traffic volume rather than the far smaller share crossing Hormuz, and questioned the warning’s operational significance.
- What would be hit: Sarimifar said the cables carry “a significant share of data traffic for countries along the southern Arabian Gulf coast, Kuwait, and parts of Iraq, Jordan and Syria.” He said overland routes through Saudi Arabia and Egypt could absorb some diverted traffic, and that naval movement toward the cables would change his assessment.
- Precedents: Three Red Sea cables were damaged in February 2024, likely by the anchor of the Rubymar after a Houthi missile strike, with repairs taking six months, per TeleGeography. Four more were damaged there in September 2025, per CSIS. Four cuts off West Africa in March 2024 disrupted 13 countries.
- Legal constraints: The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea protects cable laying and maintenance under Article 79, and Article 113 requires states to criminalize certain intentional or negligent damage on the high seas. The ICRC notes civilian telecom infrastructure is generally protected from direct attack absent specific military-objective criteria.
- Knock-on risks: Gulf states host data centers and cloud services for major technology firms, and cable damage could affect their external connectivity depending on available alternative paths. Satellite services such as Starlink offer partial relief but cannot match subsea capacity for intercontinental data volumes.
Background:
Javani’s warning follows earlier Iranian threats against underwater internet infrastructure in the Arabian Gulf. Regional repairs could be delayed if security risks restrict access for specialized cable ships, though alternative subsea and overland routes mean slower repairs do not automatically mean prolonged outages.
Between the lines:
The gap between the warning and its execution is measurable. Hormuz carries under 1% of international bandwidth, the main Europe-Asia arteries run through the Red Sea, and the four Gulf states most exposed hold land alternatives. Sarimifar’s point that cables were already rerouted through Omani waters over Iran cuts both ways: an attack would strike networks serving Iran’s neighbors, and by his account Iran itself.
What’s next
Watch for evidence of Iranian naval movement toward cable routes, which Sarimifar said would warrant a different assessment, and for Gulf operators announcing additional overland capacity through Saudi Arabia or Egypt.
