Israel feeding Saudi Arabia intelligence on Houthis, security sources say

The latest:

Israeli intelligence support for Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthis is already flowing, The Jerusalem Post reported, citing security sources who said Israel is providing early warning data, target identification and a broader picture of the battlefield. The same sources said the quality of that intelligence is improving even as Houthi strikes continue to inflict heavy damage across several Saudi regions.

Details:

• The contribution: Security sources told The Jerusalem Post the Israeli military’s intelligence role has grown over time, covering early warning, target identification and situational awareness. Israel’s defense establishment sees an opening to deepen ties with Riyadh but avoids discussing it publicly for fear of inflaming the situation.
• Trump’s framing: Asked whether he believed Riyadh would normalize relations with Israel, President Donald Trump said: “I think so, I think they will. Israel has been very supportive of Saudi Arabia.” His remarks followed reports that Israel might extend military and intelligence support as Houthi attacks escalated.
• The denial: Turkey’s Anadolu Agency reported on 13 October, citing Haaretz, that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman rejected Israeli efforts to join the military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, despite American mediation aimed at securing Riyadh’s consent. Saudi authorities issued no immediate comment.
• What Riyadh needs: Ron Ben-Yishai argued in a Ynet analysis published 18 October that Saudi Arabia urgently needs early-warning radar and air defense batteries able to handle multiple threat types, potentially including Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow 2, against Houthi ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and explosive drones.
• The skepticism: The same Ynet analysis assessed that intelligence sharing does not mean a political agreement is near, noting Riyadh still insists on discussing Palestinian statehood while Israel needs to reinforce its own defenses. It cited solid grounds to doubt Trump’s remarks represent a genuine breakthrough.
• The Washington variable: The Jerusalem Post reported that Israel views the cooperation as expandable once the American position on Iran becomes clear. The Trump administration struck Houthi targets in March and April 2025 before concluding that a deal with the group was preferable to continued military action.
• How it started: The Israel-Houthi confrontation dates to the period after Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack, when the Iran-backed group began striking Israel and seizing vessels it said were linked to it. Several targeted ships had no direct Israeli ownership or clear operational ties.
• The Galaxy Leader: Houthi fighters rappelled from a helicopter onto the car carrier Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea on 19 November 2023 and diverted it to Yemen. The Japanese-owned vessel was linked to Israeli businessman Abraham Ungar; none of its 25 crew were Israeli, and they were held until January 2025.
• The wider map: Riyadh has previously coordinated against the Houthis with Egypt and the UAE, both of which hold formal ties with Israel through the Camp David treaty and the Abraham Accords. Israel also works closely with US Central Command.

Background:

Saudi Arabia has been at war with the Houthis since 2015. Since the Abraham Accords launched in 2020, Riyadh has taken a wait-and-see approach to joining, preferring that Israel first take positive steps on the Palestinian issue.

Between the lines:

The Jerusalem Post assessed that broader cooperation would strengthen regional defense links, early-warning systems and intelligence sharing against both Iranian-backed and direct Iranian threats, pointing to 2024, when several states helped intercept Iran’s missile barrages on Israel. But converting quiet coordination into declared Israeli-Saudi cooperation runs through Saudi political calculations and the Palestinian file, not military capability alone.

What’s next

Watch for any Saudi official response to the Anadolu and Haaretz reports, for a clarified US position on Iran — strikes versus continued sanctions — and for whether Riyadh softens its stated two-state precondition for normalization.