Dr. Abdulrahman Al Dhaheri
The Middle East is once again confronting a familiar paradox, only this time in a far more dangerous form: diplomacy is advancing under the shadow of missiles, military threats and an increasingly volatile confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz.
Both Tehran and Washington continue to speak the language of negotiation. Yet the reality on the ground suggests something very different. What is taking shape is not a conventional diplomatic process, but a struggle to redefine the balance of power before serious negotiations can begin.
When Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told the United Nations General Assembly that Iran would “not surrender,” while reaffirming his commitment to diplomacy, he was effectively defining the limits of Tehran’s room for maneuver. His message served two audiences at once: domestically, it reinforced the image of a state resisting external pressure; internationally, it signaled that negotiations remain possible, provided dialogue is not interpreted as Iranian weakness.
Washington is pursuing a similarly hard-edged formula. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described diplomacy as a difficult process that requires time, while simultaneously emphasizing that President Donald Trump retains military options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
This is therefore not diplomacy between equal partners operating in a climate of trust. It is negotiation conducted beneath the ceiling of deterrence, compounded by a deep legacy of suspicion and previous accusations that earlier understandings were not respected.
The situation became even more complicated with the emergence of 7 conditions reportedly set by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei as prerequisites for future negotiations, and conveyed through regional mediation involving Qatar and Pakistan to Trump’s office.
By setting a high price before formal talks begin, Tehran is attempting to strengthen its bargaining position and secure political concessions before entering substantive negotiations.
There is also a striking divergence within Iran itself. While the government continues to promote diplomatic engagement, the Revolutionary Guards have rejected American outreach, insisting that military confrontation will continue for as long as hostility persists, while leaving formal diplomacy to the Foreign Ministry.
This could represent a calculated division of roles between diplomatic flexibility and military deterrence. But it may also reflect the reality of multiple decision-making centers competing to shape Iran’s broader strategy.
The crisis, moreover, is no longer confined to the nuclear question. The Strait of Hormuz has become central to the equation. Reported French efforts to formulate a UN Security Council resolution aimed at restoring international navigation underline how closely any future settlement will be tied to maritime security and the balance of power in the Gulf.
What is unfolding, then, is less a path toward immediate de-escalation than a mutual exercise in strategic exhaustion.
Tehran wants to preserve its regional position without appearing to retreat under pressure. Washington is seeking to narrow Iran’s options before any eventual agreement.
Between Iran’s conditions and America’s military threats, diplomacy remains suspended between bargaining and escalation. The decisive moment may come not from another public declaration, but from Washington’s response to Tehran’s demands—or from a single miscalculation that transforms diplomacy under fire into a much wider confrontation.