Dr. Abdulrahman Al Dhaheri
For decades, the Gulf states have invested heavily in their security. They have built modern armed forces, acquired some of the world’s most advanced defense systems, and developed strategic partnerships with leading military powers. Each regional crisis brought another round of investment, another layer of protection, another lesson learned.
Yet the latest tests of Gulf security have exposed a problem that money and military technology alone cannot solve.
The Gulf has considerable power. What it still lacks is the ability to consistently exercise that power collectively.
This is the deeper significance of Dr. Anwar Gargash’s recent call for stronger Gulf cooperation. The challenge facing the Gulf Cooperation Council is no longer simply how to strengthen six national defense systems. It is whether six sovereign states can develop a common security architecture capable of acting decisively when their shared strategic space comes under threat.
That distinction matters because the threat environment has changed faster than the institutions designed to confront it.
Missiles, drones, cyberattacks and threats to maritime infrastructure do not respect national boundaries. A threat may be detected by one Gulf state, cross the airspace or waters of another, and be best countered by capabilities located in a third. In such an environment, national strength remains essential, but its effectiveness increasingly depends on integration.
The Peninsula Shield Force remains an important symbol of collective Gulf defense, but today’s security environment demands something broader. The GCC does not need to dissolve six armed forces into a single Gulf army. Nor should integration come at the expense of national sovereignty.
What it needs is an integrated defense architecture that preserves sovereignty while making collective action possible: shared situational awareness, rapid intelligence exchange, interoperable defense systems and, above all, agreed mechanisms for political and military decision-making.
Technology is the easier part. Politics is harder.
Six governments can buy six sophisticated defense systems. Agreeing on what constitutes a common threat, when collective responsibility begins, and what level of aggression should trigger a joint response is considerably more difficult. Yet without such understandings, even formidable national capabilities can remain strategically fragmented.
Iran makes this dilemma impossible to ignore.
Geography cannot be changed, and permanent confrontation with Tehran is neither realistic nor desirable. Gulf states have good reason to pursue dialogue, manage tensions and prevent crises from escalating into war. But engagement and deterrence are not competing strategies.
Effective diplomacy requires both.
A more integrated Gulf defense posture would not necessarily make confrontation with Iran more likely. It could do the opposite. Deterrence works when the other side understands both the capabilities it faces and the consequences of crossing established lines. If Tehran knows that coercion against one GCC member cannot easily be isolated from the security interests of the others, the space for miscalculation narrows.
The relationship with the United States requires similar clarity.
Washington remains indispensable to Gulf security and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. But the United States is a global power. Its strategic attention is divided among China, Russia, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. American priorities can shift with administrations, crises and changes in the international system.
For the Gulf states, there is no comparable shift of geography. The Gulf is home.
The objective, therefore, should not be to replace the United States, but to rebalance the relationship: American power should reinforce a credible Gulf security system rather than substitute for one. A stronger GCC would make the partnership with Washington more sustainable, not less important.
For the United Arab Emirates, the logic is particularly clear. The UAE has built substantial national capabilities while pursuing an active diplomacy aimed at reducing regional tensions. But experience has also demonstrated the limits of purely national security strategies. Abu Dhabi cannot be insulated from instability affecting Riyadh, Muscat, Manama, Doha or Kuwait — just as developments affecting the UAE inevitably carry consequences beyond its borders.
Energy networks, ports, shipping lanes, critical infrastructure and supply chains have already created a level of Gulf interdependence that political institutions now need to match.
This may ultimately be the GCC’s defining test.
The Council has survived wars, diplomatic ruptures and profound regional upheaval. That resilience matters. But survival is no longer an ambitious enough measure of success.
The next stage must be about turning coordination into commitment — and national capabilities into collective leverage.
The Gulf is not short of power. Its unfinished task is political: deciding how that power will be shared, coordinated and used when it matters.
The question for the next crisis should no longer be who will defend the Gulf.
It should be whether the Gulf is ready to defend itself.