Dr. Abdulrahman Al Dhaheri
The BRICS summit in New Delhi was more than an economic occasion for Iran. It was also a political test of how far Tehran can turn membership in the group into practical influence that eases its isolation. The clearest conclusion is that BRICS can provide Iran with diplomatic and economic space, but it cannot replace bilateral relationships or offer a political and security umbrella for Tehran’s choices.
In that context, the meeting between Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian carries political significance. It does not mean that disagreements between the two countries have disappeared, nor does it signal a fundamental shift in the UAE’s position toward Iran. What it does show is that direct communication at the highest levels remains open at a particularly sensitive regional moment.
Official statements referred to regional and international issues of common concern, efforts to support de-escalation, stability, peace and development. They did not establish that a new agreement or specific understanding had been reached. Still, the continuation of dialogue itself points to a clear Emirati approach: managing the relationship with Iran through direct engagement while preserving national interests and established positions.
This is where the equation of “Iran after BRICS” begins.
Tehran can use its membership to expand ties with China, Russia, India and other states, but it cannot assume that these countries will become a single political bloc behind it. Each has its own economic and security calculations, as well as its own relationships with the United States and Gulf states. Treating BRICS as a unified front against the West will therefore remain limited unless membership produces trade, investment, financing, payment mechanisms and durable economic partnerships.
The deeper challenge for Iran is that closer ties with non-Western powers do not erase geography. Iran will remain a state overlooking the Gulf and neighboring its Arab states, tied to them by immediate economic and security interests. For Tehran, improving relations with Gulf countries may therefore prove more important than simply expanding its presence in international groupings.
The UAE is particularly relevant in this equation.
It has been a full BRICS member since January 2024, while maintaining broad strategic partnerships with the United States, India, China and Europe. That gives Abu Dhabi a different kind of strategic flexibility: diversified relationships without dependence on a single axis.
From this perspective, UAE-Iran dialogue should not be interpreted as comprehensive political rapprochement. Dialogue is not a substitute for protecting Gulf security, navigation and energy interests, nor does it replace international partnerships. It is a tool for managing risk, delivering messages directly and reducing the danger of miscalculation in a region exposed to escalation.
That is the real importance of the meeting between Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed and Pezeshkian. The message is not that differences have vanished, but that they can be managed through direct political contact. The UAE is not seeking an ideal relationship with Iran; it is seeking a stable one that can be controlled when interests diverge.
Iran, meanwhile, faces a practical choice after BRICS: whether to use its wider international access to strengthen its negotiating position, or turn membership into another platform for political rhetoric without measurable gains. BRICS may help ease some effects of isolation, but it will not remove the regional issues that complicate Tehran’s relations with its neighbors.
The political judgment is straightforward. BRICS gives Iran more international room, but its weight will ultimately be measured by its ability to convert that space into practical interests, especially in its Gulf relationships. The UAE, by contrast, appears to be dealing with Tehran through a policy of managing disagreement and protecting interests, without allowing dialogue to come at the expense of its security principles or international partnerships.