The Gulf did not start this war, and it did not seek it. And yet its cities and infrastructure were targeted. In a moment like this, the question becomes simpler than all the mediations of recent months: if the force firing today possessed a nuclear margin, as Trump’s envoy claims, would it have shown restraint tomorrow?
At one of the most tense moments the region has faced, Steve Witkoff relayed a startling account from the negotiating track: he said Iranian negotiators spoke without embarrassment about possessing roughly 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, and that they understood this quantity could translate into enough material for 11 nuclear bombs—presenting it as the starting point of their negotiating position.
Even if one disputes the technical precision of each figure or the way he framed it, the political value of the message is one thing: we are dealing with a party that approaches the most dangerous file in the world with the logic of showmanship and hauteur, not the logic of reassurance.
Now place that account on the same table as what the Gulf has lived through since the war on Iran began.
On day one, Iran struck sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, met by air interceptions, injuries and damage, and temporary airspace closures in more than one country.
On day two, explosions and strikes continued at a recurring pace, with deaths and injuries here and there.
Then day three came to cement the same meaning: a new wave of missiles and drones, with at least five Gulf states reporting material damage, at minimum.
So we are not talking about an isolated incident, but a series of consecutive attacks over three days, accompanied by a stubborn and deliberately arrogant intent, hitting cities, facilities, and infrastructure—and forcing states into emergency measures such as closing airspace and suspending some activities.
Here the lesson for the Gulf becomes painful, despite its obviousness:
all of these states sent signals of de-escalation. Some volunteered to open mediation channels. They tried to cool the escalation. And yet when the war erupted, none of that diplomacy granted them immunity from missiles and drones.
If this force does not hesitate today to strike civilian areas and critical infrastructure in neighboring countries while under conventional military pressure, then the question that must be said out loud is: what if it possessed a nuclear umbrella or maximal deterrent capacity? Would it restrain its hand—or unleash it even more?!
That is why betting on the language of diplomacy alone, when facing a party that acts by the logic of dominance and rough coercion, is not simply a form of rationality—it is a direct gamble with these states’ security, their economies, and the stability of their cities.
So what is required?
If we turn to Carl Schmitt’s definition that politics, at its core, is knowing the difference between friend and enemy, then helping friends destroy the capabilities of an explicit enemy that does not hesitate to distribute its destructive messages over everyone’s heads means that, without hesitation, we should adopt clear defensive alignment with the United States in protecting airspace and vital facilities, sharing intelligence, strengthening air and naval defenses, and raising the cost of targeting politically and legally through unified positions—naming these attacks for what they are: a blatant assault on the sovereignty of the region’s states, not merely an incidental byproduct of war as the enemy would like to frame it through the exchange of contradictory roles. Everyone should support a firm course to prevent Iran’s nuclear programme: any deal that does not remove the enrichment threat and impose stringent verification mechanisms is postponement of the crisis, not a solution.
What is needed here is not a vengeful rhetoric, but the adoption of a strategy that neutralises the attacker’s ability to repeatedly strike cities and infrastructure.
When our cities are within missile range, the language of “civilised states” alone is not enough. Alongside the proven effectiveness of defensive interception, we need solid and durable alliances with every party that shares the same objective, and we must distinguish friend from enemy on the basis of national interests alone.
