Caroline Haïat
For Israel, the Houthi threat is no longer simply a long-range missile problem.
The latest escalation in Yemen has transformed the group from a distant source of missile and drone attacks into a growing regional security challenge, linking Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Red Sea in an increasingly interconnected theatre. The most significant development may be the reported emergence of direct security cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
According to regional diplomatic sources cited by Walla and The Jerusalem Post, the two countries have held talks mediated by U.S. Central Command aimed at helping Riyadh counter the Houthi threat through intelligence assistance. Israeli intelligence was reportedly shared to help Saudi Arabia build a clearer picture of Houthi deployments and anticipate future operations.
The Houthis have sharply escalated their campaign against Saudi Arabia while expanding their territorial and maritime position along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. On September 10, they seized the strategic port city of Mocha and subsequently advanced towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
They have also seized strategically located islands in the Red Sea, increasing their ability to threaten one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
On Saturday, September 19, the escalation reached a new level when the Houthis launched missiles and drones toward Saudi Arabia, including an attack targeting Riyadh.
Saudi authorities said a ballistic missile aimed at the capital was intercepted, while additional attacks against Yanbu, Taif, Baysh and Farasan were also thwarted. The Houthis claimed attacks against sensitive targets and an Aramco facility in Yanbu, although the claim concerning the oil facility had not been independently verified.
For years, the Houthis were primarily viewed through the lens of Yemen’s civil war and their ability to launch missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia.
That picture is changing. Their recent advance along the western Yemeni coast gives them greater leverage over the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
The capture of Mocha, combined with their seizure of Red Sea islands, brings the group closer to controlling or disrupting maritime traffic around Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Bab el-Mandeb is a critical artery for trade and energy shipments between Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
Any sustained disruption can force shipping companies to reroute vessels, increasing sailing times, fuel consumption, insurance costs and freight rates.
The strategic importance of the waterway is even greater because the region is simultaneously facing severe disruption around the Strait of Hormuz.
The result is a potential pressure point at both ends of the Arabian Peninsula. Iran has already demonstrated its ability to threaten the Gulf’s principal energy chokepoint through the crisis around Hormuz.
The Houthis are now increasing pressure on the Red Sea’s southern entrance. For Saudi Arabia, that creates a particularly serious vulnerability.
Riyadh spent decades developing infrastructure designed to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The most important component is the East-West Pipeline, which transports Saudi crude from the eastern oil-producing regions to the Red Sea, allowing exports to reach international markets without passing through Hormuz.
A recent Houthi drone attack targeted Saudi oil infrastructure and contributed to a partial shutdown of activity along the kingdom’s main east-west oil pipeline, according to regional reporting.
That creates a strategic paradox.
Saudi Arabia built an alternative route precisely to reduce its exposure to a vulnerable maritime chokepoint. The Houthis are now demonstrating that infrastructure designed to bypass one vulnerability can itself become a target.
The threat became even more significant with the latest attacks on Yanbu, a major Red Sea industrial and energy hub. The economic implications are immediate.
Brent crude moved above $100 a barrel amid growing concerns over regional energy disruptions, although prices have also been affected by developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and broader U.S.-Iran tensions.
This is why the Houthi campaign is no longer simply a military problem. It is an energy-security problem.And increasingly, it is a global trade problem.
This is where the Israeli dimension becomes increasingly important.Israel has faced repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks during the wider regional conflict. But the latest escalation demonstrates that the Houthis can simultaneously threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, energy infrastructure and international shipping.For Israel, this creates a strong incentive to improve its intelligence picture of Yemen.
For Saudi Arabia, Israeli intelligence capabilities could provide an additional layer of early warning concerning missile-launch sites, military deployments, weapons movements and planned operations.
Israel and Saudi Arabia still do not have formal diplomatic relations. But the two countries have increasingly overlapping interests in limiting Iran’s regional reach, protecting maritime routes and preventing the Houthis from establishing a durable strategic position along the Red Sea.
The reported contacts do not amount to a formal alliance, nor do they necessarily indicate imminent normalization. But they illustrate how a common threat can create practical cooperation even when political differences remain unresolved.
The Houthi advance also highlights the logic of Iran’s regional strategy.
Tehran does not necessarily need to confront Israel or Saudi Arabia directly on every front. Supporting capable regional partners allows it to create pressure across multiple theatres simultaneously.
The Houthis offer a particularly valuable strategic position: access to the southern entrance of the Red Sea.
Iran can therefore operate through a network of pressure points. Hezbollah has historically provided leverage against Israel from the north. Iran-aligned groups operate in Iraq and Syria.
The Houthis provide access to the Red Sea and the approaches to the Gulf of Aden, while also possessing the ability to threaten Saudi territory and international shipping. This creates a regional network rather than a single battlefield.
The degree of Iranian operational control remains contested. The Houthis are closely aligned with Tehran and have received Iranian support, but the group retains its own political and military objectives. Recent reporting has nevertheless highlighted Iranian assistance to the Houthi campaign as the group has expanded along Yemen’s western coast.
The Red Sea is particularly sensitive because it connects major Asian manufacturing economies with European markets. Persistent insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb can force vessels to take longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days to journeys and increasing fuel and operating costs.
A prolonged disruption could affect regional trade, supply chains, tourism, shipping and the economic corridors that Israel and Gulf states have sought to develop in recent years.
The practical question is no longer simply whether Israel and Saudi Arabia will establish formal diplomatic relations. It is whether the two countries can cooperate on specific security challenges even without normalization.
For Israel, however, the strategic issue is increasingly difficult to separate from the wider regional system.The Houthis are no longer operating only within Yemen’s civil war.
They are affecting Saudi energy infrastructure, threatening international shipping, placing pressure on global oil markets and creating new incentives for intelligence cooperation between countries that still lack formal diplomatic relations.
The chain reaction is straightforward: a conflict in Yemen can disrupt maritime traffic; disrupted maritime traffic can affect energy prices; energy shocks can affect inflation and economic growth; and a threat originating on the Red Sea can bring Israel and the Gulf states into closer security coordination.
The Houthi campaign may therefore be producing an unintended strategic consequence.
Instead of remaining a localized Yemeni conflict, it is helping reshape the security architecture of the Red Sea and pushing Israel and Saudi Arabia toward greater practical interdependence, even as their formal diplomatic relationship remains unresolved.