Caroline Haiat
From Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to Pakistan and the Gulf, regional powers are beginning to build their own security networks — a sign that the American-led order is being reshaped from within.
For decades, the security architecture of the Middle East rested on a relatively simple assumption: when regional tensions became too dangerous, Washington would ultimately step in.
That assumption is changing.
The clearest signal came on August 7, when Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. The pact includes a collective-defense provision under which an attack against one member is considered an attack against all three. While its precise military obligations remain deliberately ambiguous, its political significance is harder to ignore.
This is not yet a Middle Eastern NATO. Nor does it mean Saudi Arabia, Türkiye or Pakistan are abandoning their existing relationships with the United States.
But it demonstrates something increasingly important: regional powers are preparing for a Middle East in which they cannot assume that Washington will always provide the ultimate security guarantee.
The shift did not happen overnight.
In March, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye began developing a broader framework for regional cooperation. The four countries have since continued consultations, reflecting a wider desire among regional powers to coordinate their interests rather than simply respond to decisions made in Washington.
The logic behind this emerging network is straightforward. Gulf states have watched missiles and drones cross the region, while the war with Iran has exposed the vulnerabilities of countries that traditionally relied heavily on external protection.
Saudi Arabia, in particular, has strong reasons to diversify its security partnerships.
Riyadh does not want to choose between Washington, Beijing, Ankara or Islamabad. It wants leverage with all of them.
Türkiye brings one of NATO’s largest militaries and an increasingly sophisticated defense industry. Pakistan brings a large military and nuclear deterrence. Saudi Arabia brings financial power, strategic geography and influence across the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Together, they create a different kind of strategic equation.
For Israel, however, the question is more immediate.
Donald Trump has repeatedly presented himself as Israel’s ultimate security guarantee. As tensions with Iran flared again last week, he sought to reassure Israelis directly. “Israel should not worry. You know why? Because I’m the president and I will take care of Israel,” Trump told Israel’s public broadcaster Kan.
For Jerusalem, those words carry considerable weight today. But they also contain a strategic vulnerability: Trump will not be president forever.
His second term is constitutionally limited to four years, and the 2028 succession race remains wide open. Trump himself has not endorsed a successor, while potential Republican contenders such as Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are already being discussed.
That uncertainty should matter to Israeli strategists.
Israel cannot build a long-term national security doctrine around the assumption that the next American president will have the same worldview, priorities or willingness to confront Iran as Trump.
The question is therefore not whether Israel should remain America’s closest ally. It should.
The question is whether Israel should prepare for the possibility that, in a future confrontation with Iran, the United States may not intervene in the same way — or at all.
That does not necessarily mean Israel will be isolated. It means that Jerusalem may increasingly have to develop the military, diplomatic and economic capacity to act independently when its core security interests are threatened.
This is particularly relevant as Washington itself begins thinking about the Middle East beyond the current conflict. The Trump administration is reportedly developing a post-war strategy aimed at containing Iran and advancing normalization between Israel and its neighbors, but the plan is explicitly designed for the remainder of Trump’s presidency and would have to be reassessed by whatever administration follows him.
The Middle East may therefore not be moving toward a post-American order.
It may instead be moving toward a post-monopoly order — one in which Washington remains the most powerful external actor, but is no longer the only actor capable of shaping regional security.
For Israel, that means preparing for two realities at once: an America that remains indispensable today, and an America whose future commitment cannot be taken for granted.
The strategic challenge for Jerusalem is not to abandon Washington.
It is to ensure that, if one day Washington says “not this time,” Israel is still ready to defend itself.