Marc Champion,
After the war with Iran, the Gulf states face a question they can no longer postpone: how can they protect their cities, economies and strategic projects if the American security umbrella itself could not stop them from becoming targets?
Bloomberg Opinion columnist Marc Champion argues that Washington’s Gulf allies did not want a war with Iran because they understood where it would lead: a bad peace and harder choices. The US-Iran deal, in his reading, leaves the region with an uncomfortable dilemma: should it try to contain Iran through economic incentives, or assume that deterrence has failed and prepare for more conflict?
Champion’s core point is not that Gulf states are failing to look for new security options. They already are. The problem is that each country is moving separately, guided by its own exposure to risk, while the threat itself is regional. Missiles, drones, energy routes, ports, water systems and data centers do not fit neatly inside national borders.
According to the article, the UAE suffered the heaviest attacks among the Gulf states during the war. Champion says Shahed drones destroyed 3 Amazon data centers in the UAE and Bahrain, disrupting banking systems and raising tough questions about plans to invest tens of billions of dollars in artificial-intelligence infrastructure across the Gulf.
That is the real shift. Gulf vulnerability is no longer theoretical. Cities, ports, energy and water facilities, and data infrastructure are now part of the deterrence map. For the UAE in particular, Champion writes, the choice is brutal: it cannot afford another war, but it also cannot afford a peace that leaves the threat of future Iranian attacks hanging over its business model.
The Strait of Hormuz has also become a sharper pressure point. Trump says Iran will not be allowed to control or monetize the waterway, but Champion doubts the value of that assurance. He argues that geography and the text of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding have placed the strait’s future operation largely in the hands of Iran and Oman, while Iranian officials are floating an annual revenue target of $40 billion.
Reducing dependence on Hormuz, then, is no longer optional. The UAE, according to the article, wants to cut its reliance on the strait to zero by expanding pipeline capacity to Omani ports outside the Persian Gulf. Kuwait has also discussed securing pipeline capacity with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to move its oil out through alternative routes.
But escaping Hormuz is not enough. Champion’s prescription has 3 layers: diversify away from full dependence on the US as a security provider, bind Iran more deeply into the regional economy to give it a stake in stability, and strengthen Gulf ties from within, especially between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
That last point is where the current approach looks weakest. Saudi Arabia is working with Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and China. The UAE is deepening ties with Israel and India. Champion warns that these two tracks could become incompatible if they evolve into competing alliances rather than parts of a shared Gulf security design.
The conclusion is blunt: the Gulf cannot manage Iran, reduce reliance on Washington, or protect its new economy if every state builds its security alone. The answer is not abandoning the United States, nor naïvely betting that Iran will change. It is a unified Gulf security architecture that gives the region options, leverage and fewer imported rivalries.
Source: Bloomberg Opinion — Marc Champion, July 3, 2026.