The administration is chasing unproven technology when it could encourage Wall Street investment in large-scale reactors
Paul H. Tice
President Trump signed a flurry of executive orders in May 2025 designed to “usher in a nuclear energy renaissance.” The administration promised a whole-of-government approach aimed at “re-establishing the United States as a global leader in nuclear energy.” More than a year later, the federal government is no closer to its stated goal of quadrupling U.S. nuclear generation capacity from roughly 100 gigawatts in 2024 to 400 gigawatts by 2050.
The Energy Department this April issued its Annual Energy Outlook, including electricity generation capacity projections through 2050 under various forecast scenarios. Under both the baseline and high electricity demand cases, the DOE’s estimates show no increase—and, actually, a slight absolute decline—in U.S. nuclear generation capacity over the next 25 years.
Several factors contribute to the administration’s lack of progress on the nuclear front. First, the White House appears to have fallen into a technology trap. Rather than sticking with what the industry knows how to build and operate—gigawatt-sized pressurized and boiling water reactors—officials have been overly focused on approving newer technologies (like fusion power) and more-advanced designs (mainly small modular reactors), all of which are unproven at commercial scale and will likely never move the needle on generation.
Shiny object syndrome helps explain why the current U.S. nuclear fleet of 96 operating reactors includes more than 50 different commercial reactor designs, an excessive degree of diversification not warranted by national-security concerns. For the past 60 years, endless iteration has needlessly complicated an already complex regulatory approval process and deprived the nuclear industry of the normal learning process and economies of scale that come with standardization and repetition.
Second, rather than building a solid U.S. order book for new large-scale reactors, the administration has let itself be distracted by pointless nuclear trade deals such as that signed with the U.K. last September. British energy policy is feckless, especially on nuclear power. Only strong domestic demand will provide the support and credibility needed to rebuild the U.S. nuclear industry, including the requisite supply chains and industrial workforce
To his credit, Mr. Trump has pushed to build more 1.1-gigawatt Westinghouse AP1000 reactors—the only Generation III+ design to be constructed and brought online this century in the U.S.—although the administration is going about it the wrong way.
The White House last October signed a partnership between the Commerce Department and the owners of Westinghouse to jump-start the building of 10 new AP1000 units worth $80 billion in the U.S., with construction starting in 2030. In return for government financial support through the Energy Department’s Loan Programs Office and expedited permitting and regulatory approvals, the U.S. government will receive a participation interest in Westinghouse cash distributions and the option to take 20% of any future initial public offering of the company under specified conditions
In the eight months since the Westinghouse deal was announced, not one AP1000 contract has been signed in the U.S. The nation’s electric utilities aren’t stepping up because the last two AP1000 units, completed over 2023-24, came in way over budget and took more than a decade to finish, bankrupting Westinghouse in the process
Today, the challenge of building new generation isn’t on the supply side but on the demand side. Under its new postbankruptcy ownership, Westinghouse is in a strong financial position. There is no lack of capital or need to shore up Westinghouse with U.S. government ownership. Rather, the impasse is due to risk-averse utility customers balking at the outsize capital commitments and poor returns associated with green-field nuclear construction.
Due to the significant investment risks involved, no U.S. electric utility is willing to proceed with a new AP1000 project—even though the technology has been derisked by existing units that prove commercial viability and the next build should arguably be cheaper and faster than the last go-round, which included Covid-related industry disruptions at the tail end.
To overcome the lack of demand, Mr. Trump could take advantage of the fact that an increasing number of U.S. electric utilities are owned by infrastructure private-equity funds managed by BlackRock , Blackstone and other sophisticated investment firms. These private-equity investors have stronger risk management skills and development expertise than traditional utilities and are better equipped to handle nuclear construction projects, which would fit well with the growth-related investment thesis for these utility acquisitions.
Mr. Trump could deploy his standard business playbook: Summon leading Wall Street infrastructure private-equity managers to the White House and make the pitch for why things will be different this time with his promised nuclear reforms. He would need to hammer home that no additional agency rulemakings are needed to build the next AP1000 since the final blueprints (including codified change orders) are left over from the last construction project
Once private-equity owners get the AP1000 ball rolling and show proof of concept, the rest of the utility industry should eventually follow suit. A forceful nuclear push by state utility commissions and federal agencies will also be required because regulated utility executives are risk-averse, and having regulators’ support will help them make investment decisions.
Nuclear power is needed to help stabilize America’s power grid and keep pace with accelerating load growth from the digital economy. Given that it takes four to five years to build a new AP1000 reactor under a best-case scenario, the Trump administration needs to move quickly. Otherwise, today’s nuclear energy renaissance will have an even shorter half-life than the last one
Mr. Tice is a senior fellow at the National Center for Energy Analytics and author of the report “A Strategy for Financing the Nuclear Future.”