The latest:
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called Donald Trump twice at the start of the month asking the United States to strike the Houthis, and was turned down both times, the Jerusalem Post reported. Trump approved intelligence and targeting assistance instead. Ten days later, targets had been selected and bombs loaded onto American aircraft before the president halted the strike at the last moment.
Details:
- The partners’ response: Britain sent a refueling aircraft to temporarily support Saudi air force defensive operations, according to the Jerusalem Post. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistan under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed support for Riyadh, with Ankara declaring readiness to assist with technical military needs under its defense agreement with the kingdom.
- The Mecca pact: On August 7, Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense agreement in Mecca with Ankara and Islamabad stipulating that an armed attack on any of the three states is an attack on all three. The Jerusalem Post assessed the pact has not drawn Turkey or Pakistan into the war so far.
- The Iran channel: Three and a half years ago Riyadh reached a China-brokered reconciliation with Tehran, reducing the number of crises it might face rather than relying on guaranteed American help. The Jerusalem Post judged the detente did not stop the Houthis, though the channel to Tehran remains useful.
- The oil numbers: In June, 92% of Saudi crude exports shipped by sea passed through Yanbu port. The East-West pipeline, roughly 1,200 kilometers long and built to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, was moving between four and five million barrels a day.
- The September attack: On September 11, drones arriving from Iraq struck three of the pipeline’s pumping stations, temporarily halting the flow of oil through it, the Jerusalem Post reported. That left Riyadh squeezed between a disrupted Hormuz to the east and Houthi pressure on the Red Sea route to the west.
- The shipping squeeze: In July the Houthis declared a naval boycott of Saudi vessels, and the multinational maritime task force warned they had moved from threats to actual attacks on ships tied to Saudi interests. Riyadh rerouted Asia-bound oil exports through the Suez Canal, substantially lengthening voyages.
- The interceptor shortage: Prolonged regional fighting has drained American interceptor stockpiles, and Saudi Arabia is now seeking missile defense systems from its allies, the Jerusalem Post reported. Riyadh also needs intelligence, early warning capability and protection for energy infrastructure — the measure by which its new alliances will be judged.
- The Israeli offer: Israeli alignment is clearest in intelligence on the Houthis, operational experience against them, detection and interception systems, and years of linking intelligence to long-range strikes, the analysis said. It argued cooperation could begin with a warning sent in time rather than with flags and signatures.
- The normalization wall: A poll published in August 2025 found 99% of Saudi respondents described normal relations and peace with Israel as a negative step. Saudi leadership has stated it will not establish diplomatic ties without a Palestinian state on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.
- Yemen and the Gulf track: After seizing Mokha, the Houthis have made Taiz critical because the province links government-held areas, while Marib holds Yemen’s most important oil and gas fields. Trump met this week in New York with Gulf and regional leaders, with Iran central to the agenda; Qatar is pursuing a security framework including Tehran.
Background:
Vision 2030, futuristic cities, tourism, foreign investment and port hubs all rest on the premise that the kingdom has shifted from crisis-to-crisis governance to a stable, predictable destination for capital. Missiles over Riyadh and war at Bab al-Mandeb cut against that pitch.
Between the lines:
The Jerusalem Post’s reading: Riyadh runs a portfolio, not an alliance. Washington supplies weapons, Beijing economics and mediation, Ankara and Islamabad military depth, and the Tehran channel de-escalation — and Israel could occupy one slot without an embassy in Riyadh. The analysis warned Jerusalem against reading security convergence as a step toward diplomatic ties, noting improved relations with the Trump administration let Riyadh extract American gains without paying in normalization.
What’s next
Watch whether Washington shifts from intelligence support to direct strikes, whether Ankara or Islamabad converts the Mecca pact into materiel, and whether fighting in Taiz and Marib moves. Trump faces midterm elections in November.
