Dr. Al-Rahman Al-Dhaheri
The relationship between Iran and the Houthis can no longer be accurately described through the simple formula of patron and proxy. Years of war in Yemen have produced something more complex: Tehran provides weapons, expertise, technology and political support, while the Houthis have accumulated military and political capabilities that give them greater room to make decisions based on their own calculations.
That shift became particularly visible in September 2026. Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast, including control of strategic positions, ports and islands, strengthened their ability to exert pressure around Bab al-Mandeb. Reports indicate that Iranian support, including military expertise and guidance, contributed to those gains. But the outcome now extends beyond simply expanding the influence of an Iranian ally inside Yemen.
Bab al-Mandeb has become the center of the equation.
The strait is not merely part of the Yemen conflict. It links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, making it critical to global trade and energy flows. Sustained threats to shipping raise insurance and transportation costs. With navigation through the Strait of Hormuz also under pressure, Bab al-Mandeb becomes an increasingly important second maritime front in the regional confrontation.
For Saudi Arabia, the threat is no longer confined to its southern border. In July, the Houthis announced what they described as a naval blockade of the kingdom. Missile and drone attacks then escalated, while air alerts in September extended to Riyadh and other Saudi cities and regions.
This is where geography becomes political power. The greater the Houthis’ ability to influence Yemen’s western coast and Bab al-Mandeb, the greater their capacity to impose costs on Saudi Arabia and international commerce — even without being able to fully close the strait.
But that growing strength also creates a problem for Iran.
Tehran wants the Houthis to remain capable of opening an additional front against its adversaries, particularly when Iran itself faces pressure in the Gulf. Yet an armed movement with growing capabilities and independent decision-making can evolve from a relatively predictable instrument into a partner capable of escalating according to its own priorities.
This is why the relationship no longer fits a conventional command-and-control model. Iran can influence, arm and coordinate with the Houthis, but it does not necessarily control every Houthi decision. The Houthis, meanwhile, depend on Iran to develop key capabilities, but they also use those capabilities to pursue their own objectives in Yemen and across the region.
Their strategic importance therefore increasingly exceeds their weight inside Yemen. If the Houthis consolidate their position along the western coast, they become an influential actor in the security of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
The question is no longer simply whether Iran uses the Houthis.
The more precise question is how far Iran and the Houthis have begun to use each other.
Iran gains a forward pressure front far from its own territory. The Houthis gain stronger capabilities and greater regional weight. As that relationship deepens, the line between “proxy” and “partner” becomes increasingly blurred. The central issue to watch is not only how much support Iran provides, but whether Houthi power itself is becoming an independent force capable of reshaping the strategic balance across the Red Sea and the Gulf.