Dr. Abdulrahman Al Dhaheri
The difference between the UAE and Iran is not simply about military power, weapons or the size of their armed forces. At its core, it is a difference over what security itself means — and how a state believes it can best protect its future.
For the United Arab Emirates, national security is closely tied to regional stability. Trade must flow, shipping lanes must remain open, critical infrastructure must be protected, and the economy must be able to grow without being repeatedly disrupted by regional conflict.
Iran has developed a markedly different security doctrine. A central pillar of Tehran’s strategy has been to push potential threats away from its borders, build strategic depth beyond Iranian territory and maintain enough military and political leverage across the region to deter adversaries before a confrontation reaches Iran itself.
Put simply, the UAE seeks to shrink the space for conflict around it. Iran seeks to expand the geographical space in which it can deter its opponents.
That distinction matters.
The Emirati security model begins at home and extends outward. Protecting the state means protecting its population, economy, ports, energy infrastructure, water supplies, technology and investments. Regional stability is therefore not an abstract diplomatic preference. It is a strategic requirement.
Any military crisis in the Arabian Gulf, threat to the Strait of Hormuz or escalation involving missiles and drones carries consequences beyond conventional security. It potentially threatens the economic model on which the UAE has built much of its national strength.
Iran’s security thinking moves in the opposite direction: from the outside inward.
The experience of the 1979 revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the American military presence around Iran, confrontation with Israel and years of international sanctions helped reinforce Tehran’s belief that waiting for threats to reach Iranian territory is inherently dangerous.
Iran consequently invested heavily in ballistic missiles, drones and asymmetric naval capabilities while building relationships with armed regional forces. From Tehran’s perspective, influence beyond its borders provides strategic depth and additional layers of deterrence.
This produces a fundamental security dilemma.
What Iran considers forward defence can be viewed by the UAE and other regional states as a source of instability. At the same time, defensive partnerships that Abu Dhabi considers necessary to protect its territory and economic interests may be seen in Tehran as an expansion of military pressure close to Iranian borders.
There is also a direct sovereignty dispute that cannot be separated from the broader relationship: the three UAE islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. For the UAE, the issue concerns sovereignty and territorial integrity. It therefore remains part of the strategic equation regardless of economic ties or political dialogue with Tehran.
Yet competing security doctrines do not make confrontation inevitable.
Geography requires the UAE to pursue a more complicated balance: deterring Iran without turning it into a permanent enemy, while maintaining engagement without allowing that engagement to weaken the UAE’s ability to defend its interests.
That requires advanced air and missile defence, cyber capabilities, intelligence and stronger protection for ports, energy facilities, water infrastructure and other critical assets. But military preparedness alone is not enough. A direct political channel with Tehran remains equally important.
Deterrence without communication increases the risk of miscalculation. Communication without credible deterrence risks becoming ineffective.
The strategic challenge for the UAE, therefore, is not to imitate the Iranian model in order to counter it. It is to make the Emirati model more resilient: a strong economy, capable armed forces, cohesive domestic security, advanced technological defences, diversified international partnerships and a foreign policy able to combine deterrence with dialogue.
The UAE does not become safer by turning the region into an Emirati sphere of influence competing with an Iranian one. Its security is strengthened when other actors have limited capacity to threaten the country, while the UAE retains a high capacity to protect its stability, development and interests.
That is ultimately the dividing line between the two security philosophies: one treats stability itself as a source of national power; the other sees strategic depth beyond its borders as a means of protecting the state at home.