When Jared Kushner arrives in Israel alongside Tony Blair and Nikolay Mladenov, his mission will not be to persuade Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the ultimate objective of the Gaza plan. They already broadly agree on that: ending Hamas rule and disarming the group.
The problem is how to get there.
Netanyahu has publicly rejected the 15 implementation points proposed by the Board of Peace, while Washington remains committed to President Donald Trump’s broader 20-point plan. The central dispute is not over what Gaza should ultimately look like, but over which side must move first.
Israel wants Hamas fully disarmed before Israeli forces withdraw. The American approach favors gradual, reciprocal and verifiable steps: disarmament matched by withdrawals, eventually leading to the end of Hamas rule, the transfer of authority to a Palestinian technocratic administration and the beginning of reconstruction.
This is where Kushner comes in.
He is not returning to Middle East diplomacy as a conventional envoy. His previous experience, particularly with the Abraham Accords, was built around finding transactions between parties that disagreed over important details but could converge on an outcome.
Gaza now requires precisely that kind of negotiation.
Hamas has indicated a willingness to hand over its heavy weapons to the proposed new administration in Gaza, but has linked that step to an Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu, meanwhile, does not want to grant Hamas an Israeli withdrawal before ensuring that its military capabilities have been dismantled.
There is negotiating space between those positions, but very little.
The greater complication is political timing. Netanyahu is heading toward October elections, and his public rejection of the plan can also be viewed through the demands of his right-wing political base. Yet the suspension of attacks on Gaza alongside that rejection suggests he does not want to close the door on Trump completely.
That makes Kushner’s visit potentially more consequential than it appears.
Success will not necessarily mean announcing a dramatic agreement in Jerusalem. It may simply mean transforming the argument over “who moves first” into a synchronized timetable: what Hamas surrenders, where Israeli forces withdraw, who verifies compliance and when the next step begins.
The harder test will then move to Egypt, where the delegation is expected to engage with mediators.
The Gaza plan does not lack an end goal. Washington’s desired outcome is relatively clear: Gaza without Hamas rule, without a permanent Israeli military presence, with a new Palestinian administration and a path toward reconstruction.
What remains missing is a mechanism capable of moving the parties from war to that outcome.
That is the deal Kushner will now try to find.